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Chapter 1  
 
The Role of Paid Parental Leave in Reducing Women’s Career Interruptions: 







Abstract: I analyze the effects of paid parental leave on maternal labor supply.  Using monthly 
longitudinal data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, my event-study research 
design characterizes the evolution of labor-force participation around childbirth for women 
affected by paid leave laws in California and New Jersey.  I find that paid leave laws are 
associated with a substantial increase in labor-force participation in the months directly around 
birth but have little impact beyond six months after birth.  While US-style short-duration leave is 
unlikely to change prolonged exits from the labor force, my findings imply that paid leave laws 
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The influx of mothers with young children into the labor market has been a major driver of 
the steep rise in women’s labor-force participation since the 1960s.  Participation among married 
women with children under six rose from just 20 percent in 1960, to over 60 percent by 1990 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 1995, 2012).  The resulting increase in women’s years of work experience 
contributed substantially to the narrowing of the gender gap in earnings (Blau and Kahn, 1997, 
O'Neill and Polachek, 1993).  But as mothers’ attachment to the labor force has grown, the 
tension between home production and market work has increased.  Women remain far more 
likely to experience career interruptions during childbearing years than men, and women’s actual 
labor-force experience remains 20 percent below men’s (Bertrand et al., 2010, Blau and Kahn, 
2004, Byker, 2012).   
Parental leave laws are a common policy approach to mitigating the negative effects of 
childbearing on women’s careers.  Parental leave allows women to spend time away from work 
with a child while maintaining attachment to their employer through mandated job protection.   
In countries where paid leave is lengthy and generous—the OECD average is 80 weeks of leave, 
with 33 weeks of full-time equivalent paid leave (OECD, 2012)—these laws have been shown to 
increase women’s labor-force participation.  However, they also increase time away from work 
and may raise the cost of hiring women due to lost productivity during absences or costs of 
finding and training temporary replacements.  There is mixed evidence on whether these factors 
suppress wage growth and hinder women’s career advancement (Blau and Kahn, 2013, Lalive 
and Zweimüller, 2009, Ruhm, 1998). 
In contrast to other industrialized economies, leave policies in the US are short and typically 
unpaid.  The 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) guarantees 12 weeks of unpaid leave 
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for qualified employees.  Studies of FMLA find little evidence of an impact of the law on 
women’s work outcomes (Baum, 2003a, Han et al., 2009, Waldfogel, 1999).  Recently, several 
US states have expanded leave benefits beyond the federal mandate by offering short-duration 
paid leave to parents of newborn children—California’s 2004 law mandates 55 percent wage 
replacement for leave of at most 6 weeks.  Evaluations of the California law using the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) find evidence of increased use of parental leave, but are not able to 
provide conclusive evidence on how leave-taking impacts women’s attachment to the labor force 
(Espinola-Arrendondo and Mondal, 2010, Rossin-Slater et al., 2013). 
The challenge of estimating the impact of US parental leave policies stems from the laws’ 
narrow window of eligibility and the likelihood that effects may be very different in the months 
immediately around birth than in the longer term.  Section 1.3 of this paper presents a simple 
model of labor supply which shows how paid leave laws may affect women who take brief labor-
force exits after giving birth but should have less impact on women who take prolonged exits.  
Because data limitations of previous studies make it difficult to disentangle these time-varying 
effects, this paper uses longitudinal data and a flexible estimation strategy to examine both the 
short and longer-term impacts of paid leave laws in California (2004) and New Jersey (2009).   
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) allows a fuller characterization of 
women’s labor-force participation from 24 months before to 24 months after they give birth.  
Using an event-study methodology, I measure women’s career interruptions on a month-to-
month basis relative to their own labor-force participation prior to giving birth.  Triple-difference 
event-study estimates show the impact of paid leave on career interruptions by comparing    (1) 
birth-related changes in labor-force participation in California and New Jersey   (2) before and 
after enactment of paid leave laws with (3) birth-related changes for women in states without 
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paid leave policies.  
The results show that California and New Jersey paid leave laws substantially reduce the 
incidence of short-term exits from the labor force lasting less than six months—women’s labor-
force participation increases by five to 10 percentage points in the three months before to three 
months after a birth.  However, paid leave laws have little impact on sustained exits lasting six or 
more months after birth.  Testing for heterogeneous effects, I find that the reduction in short-term 
interruptions occur almost exclusively among women with less than a college education.  This is 
consistent with the fact that voluntarily-provided paid leave disproportionately benefited college-
educated women before paid leave mandates were implemented.   Paid leave laws extend these 
benefits to women lower in the skill distribution, allowing them to choose career interruption 
patterns that more closely resemble those of more-educated women. 
Opponents claim that paid leave laws, which are funded through employee payroll taxes, are 
costly mandates that burden firms with inconvenience costs.  In 2012, parents of nearly 40 
percent of all children born in California filed paid leave claims, at a cost of $470 million.  New 
Jersey paid $63 million for claims associated with nearly a quarter of all births.  The potential 
benefits to households in terms of child health and wellbeing are difficult to quantify and the 
evidence is mixed (Baum, 2003b, Berger et al., 2005, Carneiro et al., 2011, Dunifon et al., 2013, 
Rossin, 2011, Ruhm, 2004).  Advocates claim that paid leave also increases mothers’ attachment 
to the labor force, but evidence has been lacking.  While I find that short-duration leave of the 
type mandated in California and New Jersey is unlikely to change the behavior of women who 
take prolonged exits from the labor force, my results demonstrate that paid leave laws may 
induce some women to stay more attached to their jobs, in particular low-skill women.  
Increasing these women’s attachment to the labor force has the potential to increase tenure, 
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accumulated experience and long-term earnings growth, which suggests that paid leave policies 
have the potential to reduce the gender gap in earnings and earnings inequality across the 
education spectrum.   
1.2 Parental Leave in the United States 
The history of parental leave in the United States is brief as the first federal leave legislation 
was not passed until 1993. This section describes the policy landscape prior to the introduction of 
the nation’s first paid leave laws in California and New Jersey in the mid-2000s, describes trends  
1.2.A Unpaid Parental Leave 
 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) was the first bill signed into law by 
President Bill Clinton.  The bill was a major part of Clinton’s first term agenda to enact policies 
that “both increased employment and strengthened families” (Clinton, 2013).   
 FMLA mandates that eligible employees, working for covered employers, receive up to 12 
weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave within a 12-month period for specified family and medical 
reasons including the birth of a child.  Upon return from leave, workers are guaranteed their 
original or an equivalent job with equivalent pay and benefits.1 Coverage applies to public and 
private employers with at least 50 employees within 75 miles of the worksite.  Workers are 
eligible if they have worked for a covered employer for at least 12 months and at least 1250 
hours over the last 12 months (at least 25 hours on average for 50 weeks).  The Department of 
Labor estimates that in 2012, 59 percent of US workers were both covered and eligible, and that 
16 percent of those workers had taken an FMLA leave in that year (Klerman et al., 2012).  Prior 
to FMLA, 13 states required some form of unpaid parental leave, and currently 18 states offer 
unpaid leaves with less restrictive coverage and/or eligibility restrictions, and in a few cases 
                                                 
1 Health benefits are maintained under the same terms as if the employee had continued work.   
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slightly longer durations (Baum, 2003a, National Partnership for Women and Families, 2012). 
 In 2002 California passed the first law mandating paid parental leave in the United States.  
California is among five states with long-standing temporary disability insurance (TDI) 
programs that include pregnancy as an eligible “disability” for leave with partial wage 
replacement.2  These TDI states have so far been the most likely to pass paid family leave 
legislation, which is facilitated by established political support, and administrative mechanisms 
for collecting taxes and making payments for this type of program.  Two other TDI states have 
also passed paid parental leave laws -- New Jersey in 2008 and Rhode Island in 2013.3     
1.2.B Trends in Voluntary Provision of Paid Leave Benefits 
While there is no federal mandate for paid leave, the number of firms that voluntarily offer 
paid leave has increased substantially since the 1980s especially for more-educated workers.  
Figure 1.1.1 shows trends in usage of paid parental leave in the 12 weeks after a first birth among 
women who worked during pregnancy as reported in SIPP retrospective fertility modules.4  In 
the early 1980s, less than 20% of all women reported using paid parental leave, with similar rates 
for women with and without a bachelor’s degree.  By the late 2000s, 44 percent of women with 
at least a bachelor’s degree report using paid parental leave compared to only 26 percent among 
women with less than a college degree.  Figure 1.1.2 includes other types of paid leave 
(including paid sick leave, vacation leave and other leave), and indicates that while use of any 
paid leave increased for both groups, more-educated women are far more likely to use paid leave 
                                                 
2 The TDI states are California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. 
3 Washington State passed a paid leave law in 2007 providing a flat $250 benefit for up to five weeks, but 
implementation has been delayed while lawmakers seek funding for the program.  Several other states have 
proposals for paid leave laws and Senators Dodd and Stevens proposed the federal Family Leave Insurance Act in 
2007:  http://www.apwu.org/issues-fmla/stmnt-dodd.pdf 




after a birth – 60 compared to 30 percent of less-educated women.   
These findings of greater usage of paid leave among higher-skilled women from the SIPP 
concur with evidence on access to paid leave from the Bureau of Labor Statistics National 
Compensation Surveys.  In 1993, only two percent of private employees had access to leave that 
was specifically designated as family leave, though most had access to paid vacation days and 
half had some paid sick days (Van Giezen, 2013).  By 2012 the overall rate of access to paid 
family leave increased to 11 percent, and the rate in managerial and professional occupations 
was around 20 percent (around 30 percent in the financial and business sectors) while for service 
occupations the rate of access was only six percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).  Unequal 
access to paid leave was one of the drivers of new paid-leave legislation in California and New 
Jersey. These differences in access prior to implementation of the laws also suggest investigating 
whether there are heterogeneous impacts by education.   
1.2.C Details of Paid Leave laws in California and New Jersey 
California’s Paid Family Leave (C-PFL) law was passed in September 2002 and went into 
effect in July 2004.  The New Jersey Family Leave Insurance (NJ-FLI) law was passed in April 
2008 and took effect July 2009.  The California and New Jersey policies are similar in most 
respects.  Both laws provide partial wage replacement for up to six weeks for time spent caring 
for sick family members or to “bond” with a newborn or an adopted child.  C-PFL provides 55 
percent of wages up to $1067 per week, and NJ-FLI provides 66 percent of wages up to $584 per 
week.5  In both states, the six weeks of paid family leave extend existing temporary disability 
leave of ten weeks for a normal pregnancy – four before birth and six after -- under the same 
                                                 
5 These are maximum weekly payments for 2013. The California cap is indexed to the state’s average weekly wage.  
Unlike SDI benefits, paid family leave benefits are not taxed at the state level, but are still subject to federal taxes. 
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replacement rates.6,7  In both California and New Jersey paid parental leave benefits are financed 
entirely by mandatory payroll taxes levied on all private employees, which were projected to 
amount to an additional .08% tax in California and .09% in New Jersey over existing deductions 
for TDI.8,9   
While both laws have minimal eligibility and coverage restrictions, neither grants new rights 
to take a leave.  Importantly, neither law provides job protection or continuation of fringe 
benefits.  The wage replacement provided under the laws is to be used concurrently with leave 
granted either under FMLA or an employer’s voluntary program.  Therefore, these laws do not 
directly expand parental-leave access to previously un-served populations.   
Both laws were enacted at least a year before they were implemented, and there was media 
coverage of the laws at the time of passage and when they went into effect. Employers are 
required to provide information about the laws to all new employees and anyone requesting 
leave.  Surveys have shown that not all eligible worker are aware of C-PFL (Appelbaum and 
Milkman, 2011), but administrative records show a substantial and immediate increase in claims 
filed for bonding with newborns in both states.  I estimate that in 2004 the number of claims was 
roughly equal to one third of all births occurring in California among women who were 
employed a year before birth; I estimate a similar rate in New Jersey in 2010, the first full year 
the law was in effect. By 2010, six years after implementation, the number of claims in 
California was roughly equal to half of the number of births among employed women in the 
                                                 
6 There are possible extensions of disability insurance for cesarean sections or birth complications. 
7 New Jersey Law:   http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/fli/fliindex.html  California Law:  
http://www.edd.ca.gov/disability/paid_family_leave.htm 
8 The self-employed and state and local employees can opt in to the programs.  Employers may substitute with their 
own program if it is at least as generous as the state mandate. In New Jersey non-family-leave disability insurance is 
also partially funded by employer contributions.    
9 Tax incidence projections: California: Rodriguez (2004), New Jersey: Deak (2008). 
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state.10  In California in 2012 the average claim duration was 5.35 weeks with an average weekly 
benefit amount of $497; in New Jersey in 2011 the average weekly benefit was $489 and 
duration 5.3 weeks.  Summary information on claims in California and New Jersey is show in 
Table 1.1.  
Unlike TDI benefits for pregnancy, the new family leave laws apply to both mothers and 
fathers.  However, the vast majority of bonding claims are made by women – 70 percent of 
claims in California, and 89 percent in New Jersey in 2012.11  
1.3 Expected Effects of Paid Leave Laws 
The stated goal of parental leave laws is to help women balance commitments to both job and 
family out of concern that in the absence of a mandate “too many” women are “forced” to 
choose one or the other (Senator Buono, 2008).12  In the language of economics, paid leave laws 
expand the budget set to make new choices available.  Opponents claim that paid leave is an 
entitlement transfer that pays women to work less.13  But modeling the incentives created by the 
policies leads to an unexpected prediction – paid leave may lead some women to work more by 
pulling them into the labor force when they would otherwise have exited after a birth.  Arriving 
at this prediction requires making distinctions in labor force status that are uniquely important for 
                                                 
10 These estimates are based on National Center for Health Statistics state-level natality records by state, claims as 
reported by the California Employment Development Department and the New Jersey Department of Labor and 
Workforce Development, and the author’s estimates in the SIPP of labor-force participation rates among women 
who give birth in each state. 
11  The number of fathers making claims in California has increased from 17 percent of claims in 2004 to 30 percent 
of claims in 2012.  However, statistics are not available on the duration of leaves by gender, so that men may be 
taking a lower percentage of total leave weeks than this trend implies. 
12 On March 3, 2008, the day the New Jersey bill was approved by the state senate, Senator Barbara Buono, co-
sponsor of the bill stated "Far too many individuals have had to make the tough decision between caring for a loved 
one and being able to maintain their income…These are choices that should never have to be made in the United 
States, and soon they will no longer be choices forced upon New Jersey families." 
13 This claim is bolstered by a recent working paper by Dahl et al. (2013) who find that paid maternity leave reforms 
in Denmark had little effect on a wide variety of outcomes including parental labor-force participation. However the 
Danish policy context is very different from US, and the authors point out “it is important to distinguish between the 
introduction of paid leave (and job protection) versus the continual expansions to a program.” 
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parents of young children. 
Working is ordinarily synonymous with being in the labor force, but for mothers of newborns 
the distinction is important.  Clearly a woman who separates from her employer to spend time at 
home with her child is both out of the labor force and not working; but a woman who maintains 
her attachment to her employer and takes job-protected parental leave is in the labor force even 
though she is not working.  This is more than a semantic distinction.14  Parental leave is a legal 
arrangement whereby a woman maintains benefits and is guaranteed the same wages when she 
returns to work.  She also maintains her firm-specific human capital/tenure and avoids the search 
cost of looking for a new job.  The woman who is not working because she exited the labor force 
forgoes this value by severing attachment to her employer. 
I present a simple illustrative model that generates predictions for the impact of paid leave on 
three work-related outcomes: 1) weeks worked, 2) weeks of paid leave, and 3) weeks in the labor 
force.  The model uses the structure of US policies and evidence on how labor-force exits affect 
wages to identify predictions for all three outcomes.  The goal of my empirical strategy is to test 
the model’s predictions for how paid leave effects labor-force participation which compliments 
and extends the existing literature that has studied impacts on leave-taking but has been unable to 
provide conclusive evidence for other work outcomes.     
1.3.A Labor Supply Model and Predictions 
 Consider a woman choosing how much labor to supply in the longer-term (T) after the birth 
of a child.  Utility is derived from consumption and time spent at home.15 Individual preferences 
                                                 
14 Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) have an excellent discussion of the work-employment distinction among mothers 
of young children. 
15 U = u(C,H), where the utility function is strictly convex and monotonic.   
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are based on a woman’s relative taste for time spent with children compared to time spent at 
work.  These tastes are driven by factors such as cultural norms, professional identity, and 
satisfaction from time spent with children. The budget constraint is determined by a woman’s 
potential income from working (Y*), unearned income (µ) such as spousal income, and the 
parental-leave policy environment.  
 Figure 1.2.1 illustrates a woman’s budget constraints under different parental leave policies.  
I assume every woman must take a minimum, medically-necessary amount of time to give birth 
and recover from delivery.  Point A represents the amount she can consume if she takes no other 
time away from work after giving birth, 𝐴 = 𝑌∗ = 𝑤𝑇 + 𝜇, where w is her wage prior to giving 
birth.  I first consider a case in which she can spend as much unpaid time away from work as she 
desires and can return to the same job at the same wage, resulting in a budget constraint,  
𝐶 = 𝑤(𝑇 − ℎ) + 𝜇 
where h is number of weeks spent at home. In Figure 1.2.1 this constraint is represented by ABT. 
 In fact, employers are unlikely to hold a woman’s job, and FMLA mandates job protection 
for only 12 weeks.  So it is more realistic to assume that if a woman chooses to be at home for 
longer than 12 weeks she must separate from her employer and exit the labor-force.  I assume 
that exits are costly which causes a kink point in the budget constraint at 12 weeks.16 Exit costs 
can arise due to depreciation of skills while away from work, wage penalties due to a perceived 
lack of commitment to work “signaled” by labor-force exit, or search costs of looking for a new 
job (Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010, Hotchkiss and Pitts, 2007, Mincer and Polachek, 1974).  I 
characterize the exit cost as a wage penalty, resulting in a shallower slope in the budget 
                                                 
16 The model has elements similar to a “conceptual framework” described in Han, Ruhm and Waldfogel (2009). 
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constraint after 12 weeks and therefore a discontinuous drop in consumption 
𝐶 = (𝑤 − 1{ℎ > 12} ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦)(𝑇 − ℎ) + 𝜇 
this new budget constraint under FMLA conditions is represented in Figure 1.2.1 as ACDBT. 17 
 With the introduction of paid leave, I assume for simplicity that the mother is guaranteed full 
wage replacement for 12 weeks – the same duration as unpaid leave under FMLA.18  A woman 
can now spend up to 12 weeks at home and maintain the same level of consumption as if she 
took no time off: 
𝐶 = 1{ℎ ≤ 12} ∗ (𝑤𝑇 + 𝜇) +  1{ℎ > 12} ∗ (𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦) ∗ (𝑇 − ℎ). 
 This new budget constraint under paid leave is represented in Figure 1.2.1 as AEDBT.  
 To generate predictions for how the introduction of paid leave laws will affect 1) weeks at 
home (or conversely time at work  = 𝑇 − ℎ), 2) weeks on leave and 3) weeks in the labor force, 
assume the budget constraint under FMLA prior to the introduction of paid leave, and consider 
three different women with preferences as described in Figure 1.2.2.  Figures 1.3.1 –1. 3.4 
illustrate the behavioral response of each type of woman to the introduction of paid leave 
benefits.    
 Case 1 (Figure 1.3.1): Prior to the introduction of paid leave, a woman with preferences 
described by U1 takes no time off beyond the medically necessary minimum, optimally choosing 
the bundle of consumption and no time at home represented by point A.  The introduction of paid 
                                                 
17 A fixed cost will give the same predictions. 
18 Partial wage replacement and different durations yield similar predictions. This duration is similar to the 
California and New Jersey laws.   
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leave expands the budget set, and her utility is increased by choosing the previously unattainable 
point E.  She increases time spent at home without separating from her employer—leave-taking 
increases, time spent with children increases, but labor-force participation is unchanged.  A 
similar case arises for any woman who optimally chooses a point between A and C on the budget 
constraint in the absence of paid leave.  If a woman optimally locates at point C prior to the law, 
she will relocate to E after the law, with no change in leave-taking, time spent with children or 
labor-force participation, but with higher income and utility compared to point C.  
 Case 2 (Figure 1.3.2): A woman with preferences described by U2 has a higher relative taste 
for time spent with children than the previous case.  Under FMLA she optimally chooses point 
B, staying at home for the full two years after a birth. The introduction of 12 weeks of paid leave 
does not alter her behavior.  Figure 3.2 shows that it would require a much longer-duration paid-
leave benefit to change the labor supply behavior of a woman who chooses a sustained time 
away from work after childbirth.  Similar predictions arise for any woman who optimally locates 
far to the right of the kink.  This behavior is also more likely to be optimal as spousal or other 
unearned income increases.   
 Case 3 (Figure 1.3.3): The third case is an example of a woman who, in the absence of paid 
leave, optimally locates to the right of the kink point, but to the left of the sustained interruption 
chosen in the previous example. Potentially due to tastes or lower spousal income, she chooses to 
return to work relatively quickly. She separates from her employer after a birth but returns to the 
labor force within four months, for example. With the introduction of a paid leave mandate, she 
attains higher utility at point E, choosing to maintain attachment to her employer and preventing 
an exit. The final result is that leave-taking increases and her labor-force participation increases.  
Meanwhile, time spent with children decreases since she returns to work more quickly under 
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paid leave than she would if she exited and had to search for a new job. 
 The previous three cases described how different types of women behave in the same job 
situation; Figure 1.3.4 describes a different type of work setting.  The previous cases assumed 
full knowledge of FMLA and that the mandate is perfectly enforced.  If women are not aware of 
FMLA or employers refuse to honor the mandate (through implicit pressure or imposing 
penalties) the budget constraint prior to the CA and NJ laws will appear as in Figure 1.3.4 – a 
woman may take no time off and choose point A, but anytime at home requires separation from 
the employer (with the associated costs discussed above) so that the budget constraint jumps 
down to point H – AHBT.  This final case is relevant given findings that some women are 
unaware of their rights under FMLA or have limited ability to bargain for those rights 
(Waldfogel 2001).  This situation may be particularly true of low-skill workers.  The introduction 
of a new law may raise awareness of parental leave and increase pressure on employers to grant 
leave, making the budget constraint AEDBT as under paid leave and shifting the optimal choice 
from point J to E. The result is increased leave-taking and increased labor-force attachment, and 
an ambiguous change in time spent with children (depending where she locates before the law).19 
 The predictions of the model guide an empirical test of my research question: does paid leave 
have an effect on interruptions in women’s labor-force participation? In summary, it is possible 
                                                 
19 This model does not account for general equilibrium effects such as shifts in labor supply due tax costs of the 
policy or shifts in labor demand due to increased “inconvenience costs” of hiring workers likely to use paid leave.  
Curtis, Hirsch and Schroeder (2013) study the impact of the California law on new hires in a general equilibrium 
framework of a workplace mandate that only benefits some workers, but whose cost is “nominally borne” by all 
employees in the form of a payroll tax.  Using data from the Quarterly Workforce Indictors, they find that wages of 
new hires who are most at risk of using paid leave (young women) are 2 percent lower than new hires among groups 
unlikely to use paid leave (young men and older women) and that employment among new hires in the at-risk group 
are relatively higher by 1.5 percent.  The results imply a small outward shift in the labor supply of women most 
likely to use paid leave in response to the law, and that their valuation of the benefit offsets the policy’s tax cost.  
Das and Polachek (2014), on the other hand, conclude using the CPS that, while participation of young women 
increases due to the law, their rate and duration of unemployment increases.  The paper hypothesizes this is due to 
employer aversion to hiring workers who may take paid leave.   
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for leave-taking to increase but have no impact on labor-force participation if, as in Case 1, all 
women who are induced to take leave would have stayed with their employer anyway. Among 
women who exit the labor force in the absence of paid leave, the model predicts that only women 
who take relatively brief exits will be induced to change their behavior as in Case 3. And because 
women who take extended exits are unlikely to be affected by the law, any impacts on labor-
force participation should be concentrated in a brief period of months around births while I 
should not expect impacts on labor-force participation in the longer-term. An empirical test of 
the impact of short-duration paid leave laws on labor-force participation thus requires an 
accurate measure of birth timing and a strategy to disentangle these time-varying effects. 
1.3.B Which Hypotheses Does Existing Literature on Paid Leave Test? 
 While there is an extensive literature on the labor market impacts of the ubiquitous and 
generous parental leave policies in Europe, paid leave mandates have only recently appeared in 
the US, and this paper contributes to the nascent literature analyzing their effects.  As the 
previous subsection demonstrates, the introduction of short-duration paid leave will likely have 
different effects on labor-market outcomes than the expansions of already-lengthy leaves that are 
studied in the European literature (ex. Dahl et al., 2013, Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009).    
 Rossin-Slater, Ruhm and Waldfogel (2012) study the effects of California’s paid leave 
law using cross-sectional data from the March CPS within a differences-in-differences 
specification.20  The paper provides robust evidence that the law increased overall leave-taking 
by mothers with children under the age of one in California, with the effects concentrated among 
less-educated women, and suggestive evidence of large gains for non-whites and unmarried 
                                                 
20 The treated group for short-term outcomes is women with children under one, and various control groups include 
women with older children, men, and women with newborns in other states.  They test for longer-term outcomes 
among women with children aged one to three years.   
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women.  This result confirms the model’s prediction that the law should weakly increase time 
spent on leave.  The CPS is well suited to study impacts on leave-taking due to detailed coding 
of labor-force status.21 However, the lack of information on precise birth timing or labor-force 
attachment during pregnancy limit the paper’s ability to studying time-varying impacts on labor-
force participation.  The study finds small insignificant effects on employment and participation 
in the first year and no significant impacts in the medium term.22  But this could be due to either 
a zero effect on participation (whereby all leave-takers are as in Case 1), or imprecision due to 
inaccurate estimates of birth timing and averaging zero long-term impacts with positive short-
term impacts since they estimate impacts for all mothers with children under one (or between 
one and three). 
 Baum and Ruhm (2013) analyze the California law using the longitudinal employment 
outcomes and accurate birth timing in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY-97).  
The findings about leave-taking, work, and suggestive evidence on job-continuity corroborate 
the predictions of the model.  Because the NLSY-97 cohort was only 19 to 23 years old when the 
California law was implemented, the difference-in-differences results compare outcomes for 
women who gave birth before age 20 to those who gave birth at age 24 on average. The paper, 
thus, provides evidence for a relatively young sub-set of the women potentially affected by the 
law, and is not able to study heterogeneous impacts by education as most college-educated 
women give birth after age 24. 23   
                                                 
21 In the CPS, while all types of leave are coded separately from time at work, paid leave and unpaid leave cannot be 
distinguished (Rossin-Slater et al 2012, footnote 14).   
22 The paper speculates that findings of increased wages and hours (marginally significant) in the medium term may 
be due to increases in “job continuity” in the first year after birth, which is consistent with the predictions of my 
model if increases in short-term attachment lead to earnings growth. 
23 Baker and Milligan (2008) also use longitudinal data though they do not directly analyze paid parental leave.  The 
paper analyzes a series of expansions in job-protected maternity leave in Canada from the 1960s to the 2000s where 
the increments go from “modest” leave durations similar to those in the US to much longer durations closer to 
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1.4 Data and Methodology to Flexibly Measure Interruptions in                                
Labor-Force Participation 
  I measure month-to-month changes in women’s labor-force participation from 24 months 
before until 24 months after a birth using an event study specification with the detailed 
longitudinal data of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  This flexible 
measure of birth-related labor-force interruptions allows me to test the time-varying predictions 
of the model presented in the previous section.   
1.4.A Survey of Income and Program Participation 
 The SIPP is a series of nationally representative household panel surveys each 
approximately 48 months long with sample sizes large enough to study state-level policies.  
Households are interviewed every four months and provide information for the current and each 
of the previous three months. To measure birth-related interruptions in labor-force participation 
both before and after the California and New Jersey laws I use the 1996, 2001, 2004 and 2008 
panels.24   
 I construct a sample of all women age 18 to 45 who give birth during each of the panels.  
I use the month of birth of each household member and variables that indicate the relationship of 
mothers to children to determine the month each woman gives birth. 25  Some women give birth 
                                                                                                                                                             
European-style mandates.  They use short 6-month panels and repeated cross-sections from the Canadian Labour 
Force Survey to estimate the impact of increasing durations of job-protected leave on leave-taking and on job 
continuity.  Given a precise measure of birth timing, they look for effects in the six months centered around birth. 
They do not directly measure labor force participation, but their findings about job-continuity confirm the 
predictions of my model that the introduction of leave—even short-duration leave—causes some women to stay 
with their employer rather than exiting the labor force. While the authors find effects in the short term, they do not 
directly compare these to effects in the longer term which would be an interesting extension since the model predicts 
that as the duration of leave benefits rises, effects on women who would otherwise take long exits from the labor 
force after a birth should increase. 
24 The timing of each panel is as follows: 1996 Panel: April 1996-March 2000, 2001 Panel: February 2001-January 
2004, 2004 Panel: February 2004-January 2008, 2008 Panel: September 2008-December 2012. 
25 If there are no other own children in the household when a woman gives birth, I code it as a first birth; otherwise I 
code it as a higher-order birth.  
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more than once during a SIPP panel, and I use the first recorded birth as the reference event for 
my analysis.26  Differential access to paid leave prior to the California and New Jersey laws for 
women with different levels of education, suggest separating the sample by education.  I define 
two categories -- less than a bachelor’s degree and at least a bachelor’s degree.27   
 I create a measure of labor-force participation for each month based on monthly labor-
force status.  A woman is only coded as out of the labor-force if she has “no job all month, no 
time on layoff, and no time looking for work.”  A woman is in the labor force if she is “with a 
job” at least one week of the month, including months when she is absent from work with or 
without pay (due to leave or layoff), or if she is looking for work.28   
 The SIPP labor-force status codes separately identify unpaid leave, but women on paid 
leave are simply coded as “with a job, worked for pay,” making it impossible to measure paid 
leave use directly.  Appendix Figure 1.2 shows results for the proportion of women coded as 
“with a job the entire month, worked all weeks,” which includes both women who are actually 
working and those on paid leave and serves as a measure of attachment to a job.29   
1.4.B Event Study Methodology 
 An event study specification (Jacobson et al., 1993) allows me to study the monthly 
pattern of labor force participation for women who give birth, and measure interruptions as 
                                                 
26 The fact that a woman has another child may naturally affect her outcomes, but the choice to have another child 
may be jointly determined with other labor-force outcomes.   
27 When categorizing women by time-varying characteristics such as age or educational attainment, I use the 
mother’s status in the month of birth as the reference level.   
28 I test the robustness of my findings to using employment—defined as being “with a job” at least one week of the 
month—as the outcome of interest rather than labor-force participation, which includes layoff and job search, and 
find that the overall trends are very similar. Results available upon request.    
29 From SIPP documentation: “a person worked each week in any month when they were (a) on the job the entire 
month, or (b) they received wages or salary for all weeks in the month, whether they were on the job or not.”  The 
SIPP asks questions about usual hours at work on a four-monthly basis, but because maternity leave is not “usual” 
the responses do not help to sort out time on paid leave versus working. 
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changes in participation relative to pre-birth attachment.   I pool all observations for women who 
give birth during a SIPP panel and estimate the following regression model by least squares  
   (1. 1)                𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶𝒊 + � 𝜹𝒋𝑩𝒊𝒕𝒋   +  𝜸𝒕 +  𝝐𝒊𝒕𝟐𝟓
𝒋=−𝟐𝟓
                    
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is labor-force participation for woman i in month t, 𝛼𝑖 are individual fixed effects and 
𝛾𝑡 are year fixed effects.30  The 𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑗  are a set of dummy variables indicating each observation’s 
timing relative to a birth, where j ranges from 24 months before to 24 months after a woman 






𝟏( 𝑡 < 𝑏𝑖 − 24)    for  𝑗 ≤ −25                                                            
𝟏(𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑗)        for − 24 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ −13 and − 11 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 24      ,       𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑                for  𝑗 = −12,                                                                 
𝟏(𝑡 > 𝑏𝑖 + 24)     for  𝑗 ≥ 25                                                                
where I omit the dummy for 12 months prior to birth (or in some cases a series of pre-birth 
months).31  All observations more than 24 months before a birth are captured by a single dummy 
and similarly for observation more than 24 months after birth (hence the sum from -25 to +25). 
 The event-study dummies, 𝐵𝑖𝑡
𝑗   jointly represent a timeline indexed to the date a woman 
gives birth and make it possible to estimate average outcomes for women who are j months 
before (or after) birth even if these women gave birth in different calendar months.  For example, 
𝐵𝑖𝑡
𝑗 = 1 if in period t, woman i gave birth j months earlier (or if j is negative, j months later.)  
                                                 
30  For the binary labor-force participation outcome, I estimate a linear probability model.  I calculate variance using 
a Huber/White heteroskedasticity-robust estimator clustered at the individual-mother level.  This allows for arbitrary 
covariance over time within units, and allows for heteroskedasticity across units, which is inherent in the linear 
probability model.   
31 With smaller sample sizes in the state-level analysis I omit a series of months so that results are not overly 
influenced by the noisy single-month estimates in the early pre-birth period.  Sample size gets smaller as I move 
away from the month of birth (as described in the data section).  The maximum sample is in the months directly 
around birth.  The results are robust to omitting other groups of pre-birth moths.  
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Since I omit 𝐵𝑖𝑡−12, the 𝛿𝑗 coefficients map out the time path of changes in participation relative 
to participation a year before the birth.  Estimating equation (1) including months prior to birth 
makes it possible to observe if changes around births are disruptions related to births, or rather 
continuations of pre-trends for women who go on to have births.   
 SIPP panels are approximately four years in length. As a result, using all of the births that 
occur in each panel will mean that not all women in my sample have information for the full 24 
lead and 24 lag months because women give birth at different points over the course of the panel.  
The individual fixed-effects specification in equation (1), however, gives consistent estimates of 
changes in participation for an unbalanced panel as long as the reason why a woman has missing 
information is uncorrelated with the 𝜖𝑖𝑡′ 𝑠.  Aside from attrition, whether I have data for a woman 
in any month j only depends on when during the panel she gives birth.  In other words, all that is 
required for consistency is that, conditional on giving birth during the panel and any time 
invariant characteristics, when over the course of the panel that birth falls is not correlated with 
omitted variables affecting participation.  It is unlikely that women would time their births 
relative to the census bureau’s schedule for fielding SIPP panels.32  Panel attrition remains a 
legitimate concern, and in a robustness check I find that the main results of the paper are 
essentially the same for a sample that excludes all women who left the panel or were absent from 
the panel for more than three straight months.33 
                                                 
32 While we may be worried that over time, age at first birth for different cohorts has shifted and that a one or two 
year difference in time of birth is relevant, by using fixed effects, I control for mothers’ birth cohort.  Another 
concern is that women may time births relative to the business cycle, which is controlled for using year fixed effects. 
33 Note that in 2004, the Census Bureau randomly dropped half of the sample for budget reasons.  I do not count 
these women as having attrited from the sample in my robustness check.  Also, some women enter the panel after 
the first wave because they enter a household that is in the panel.  These women are also not excluded in the 
robustness check.   
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1.4.C Patterns of Birth-Related Interruptions in Labor-Force Participation by Education 
My model predicts that paid leave should affect the labor-force participation of women who 
take brief birth-related exits from the labor force.  The event study methodology is well suited to 
studying time-varying patterns in outcomes. Figure 1.4 shows the results from estimating a basic 
version of equation (1)—including only individual fixed effects and event-study dummies—
among all women who give birth in the 2004 and 2008 SIPP panels plotted separately by 
education category and by first and higher-order births.34  By adding the 𝛿𝑗 coefficients back to 
the average level of participation in the left-out period, the plots show the pattern of women’s 
average labor-force participation from 24 months before to 24 months after births.  Figure 1.4.1 
shows that birth-related interruptions are common among women in both education categories.  
For women with at least a bachelor’s degree, labor-force participation falls 23 percentage points 
from 92 percent a year before first births to 70 percent two years after higher order births (24 
percent drop).  Less-educated women start with lower levels of participation prior to birth—79 
percent a year before first births—but experience a similar drop of 24 percentage points (or 30 
percent) by two years after higher order births.  
Examining the shape of the plots in Figure 1.4.1 reveals that the behavior of more- and less- 
educated women differs not only in levels of participation, but also in terms of the pattern of 
birth-related interruptions.  Women with at least a bachelor’s degree exhibit relatively stable 
levels or participation up to three months before first births, when participation drops 15 
percentage points from month -6 to month +3, and then remains relatively flat at this lower level 
for a full two years after first births.  A similar, though muted, pattern starting from a lower level 
is seen for higher-order births.   For women with less than a bachelor’s degree, participation 
                                                 
34 Appendix Table 1.1 gives summary statistics for the birth sample from the SIPP used in these figures. 
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starts to fall earlier, around a year before births.  And in contrast to the smooth level-shift after 
birth seen for more-educated mothers, the profile for less-than-bachelor’s women exhibits a dip-
and-rebound pattern around both first- and higher-order births before leveling off around six 
months after births.  For first births, between months -3 and +6, participation falls from 63 
percent to 55 percent and then rebounds to 63 percent.   
Figure 1.4.2 plots the results of estimating equation (1) pooling first and higher-order births, 
and including year fixed effects.  By simply plotting the 𝛿𝑗 coefficients, Figure 1.4.2 abstracts 
away from level differences (normalizing them to zero at -12) between the education categories 
and focuses on the different patterns in birth-related labor-force interruptions.  Recalling the 
behaviors described in the labor supply model above, the profile of participation of more-
educated women appears to be an average of Cases 1 and 2 – women who do not exit the labor 
force at all, and women who exit for extended periods respectively.  Meanwhile the pattern for 
less-educated women appears to include at least some women who exhibit the behavior 
described in Case 3 – women who take brief exits, returning to the labor force by six months 
after giving birth.35,36  These women are the types the model predicts are most likely be impacted 
by the introduction of a paid leave law.   
                                                 
35 I describe the relatively flat profile from +6 to +24 as evidence of “stable” behavior – sustained labor-force exits, 
with the remainder of the population continuously in the labor force.  A stable average could also arises from equal 
numbers of women exiting and entering the labor force in each month.  Since I have longitudinal data, I can test to 
ensure that this type of “churning” is not the underlying behavior driving the averages in the figures.  I calculate the 
duration of months in or out of the labor force for women at various points after birth.  The distribution of durations 
in a given state (in or out of labor force) at 12, 18 months, for example, is very consistent with the three cases 
discussed in Section III.A, rather than with offsetting churn behavior.  
36 Interestingly, this dip and return pattern from -3 to +6 was in evidence across the education spectrum in the 1980s 
prior to the rise in access to voluntarily-provided paid leave among college educated workers (Byker, 2012).  A 
figure comparing 1980s to 2000s birth-related interruption patterns for women with at least a bachelor’s degree is 
shown in Appendix Figure 1.1. 
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1.5 Empirical Strategy for Estimating the Impact of Paid Leave Laws                                  
in California and New Jersey 
1.5.A Identification Strategy : Triple-Difference Event Study 
 The goal is to identify the impact of laws that are implemented (1) in certain states—
California and New Jersey (2) in specific years—2004 and 2009 (3) which women are eligible 
for in some time periods—after birth—but not others—before birth.  This scenario suggests a 
triple-difference estimator such as has used by Gruber (1994) to analyze employer mandates, 
Ruhm (1998), Waldfogel (1999) and Baum (2003a) to study geographic variation in parental 
leave policies, and most recently Curtis et al. (2013) to analyze the California paid leave policy.  
Introducing a third difference beyond the standard differences-in-differences strategy allows for 
relatively weak identification assumptions, but the results are often difficult to interpret because 
they are in terms of relative differences between a treatment and control group.  Because these 
previous studies use repeated cross sections, they construct the third difference by comparing 
outcomes of women with very young children to women with older children (or even to men).  I 
observe the same women over time, so that women’s own pre-birth outcomes serve as the control 
for outcomes during the eligible period, leading to a more intuitive and easy to interpret 
comparison than is often used in a triple-differences strategy.  By comparing pre-birth 
participation to post-birth participation, my third difference is a natural measure of labor-force 
interruptions.  I compare women’s birth-related interruptions in labor-force participation in 
California and New Jersey before and after the laws with birth-related changes for women in 
states without paid leave policies to produce differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) 
estimates of the impact of the laws. 
 By measuring birth-related changes in labor-force participation in an event-study 
framework, I reveal whether the laws have different impacts in the months immediately around 
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birth as compared to one or two years after a birth.  Given the predictions of my theoretical 
framework—impacts in the short-term, but not the longer-term—this strategy will be able to 
detect effects that other studies cannot due to cross-sectional data limitations that require 
averaging estimates among all women with children under one, or children aged one to three.  
Finally, this is the first study I am aware of to analyze the New Jersey law.     
1.5.B Specification and Identification Assumptions 
 The DDD strategy controls for factors that may be correlated with outcomes through a 
series of fixed effects – year, state and state-by-year.  With a set of month-relative-to-birth 
dummies 𝐵𝑖𝑡
𝑗  defined as in equation (1), I estimate the following equation 
     𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝜃𝑖 +  𝜷′𝟏𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 +  𝜷′𝟐𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 + � 𝛿𝑗𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑗   25
𝑗=−25
 
  (1. 2)              +   𝜷′𝟑𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 × 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 + � 𝜸𝒋𝑩𝒊𝒕𝒋  𝟐𝟓
𝒋=−𝟐𝟓
× 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 + � 𝝅𝒋𝑩𝒊𝒕𝒋   𝟐𝟓
𝒋=−𝟐𝟓
× 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔   
+ � 𝛼𝑗𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑗 × 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑡𝑠 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡𝑠 25
𝑗=−25
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑠 is labor-force participation for individual i in living in state s in period t and 𝜃𝑖  is set 
of individual fixed effects.  𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 is a vector of year-specific indicator variables and 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 is a 
vector of state indicator variables.37  𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡  is an indicator equal to one if a paid parental leave 
law is in effect in period t in state s.  The vector of coefficients  𝜶𝑗 provides monthly estimates of 
the treatment effect of the laws for each month before and after birth.  I estimate equation (2) 
                                                 
37 Note that technically state fixed effects are subsumed in the individual fixed effects as each woman is categorized 
by the state in which she gives birth. 
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using ordinary least squares clustering standard errors at the individual level.38 
 Because the policy treatment varies at the state-by-year-by-month-relative-to-birth, I am 
able to control for (observed and unobserved) state-specific shocks using state-by-year fixed 
effects.  As a result, the identification assumption is that there are no unobserved 
contemporaneous shocks that only affect women around birth (but not before birth) in policy 
states in the same years that the laws go into effect.  An example of policies that would impact 
women differentially after birth than before are TANF work requirement exemptions based on 
age of youngest child which vary over time and by states.  I examine these exemptions by state 
and determine that rules did not change in the same period as the paid leave laws were enacted in 
California, New Jersey or any of the control states.   
1.5.C Analysis Sample 
 Table 1.2 provides numbers of observations by education for my analysis sample of 
women in the SIPP who give birth in California and New Jersey before and after policies are 
enacted in their respective states.  I also include a set of control states as in Rossin-Slater, Ruhm 
and Waldfogel (2013) for the main specification – New York, Florida and Texas – which are the 
next three largest states after California.  Using the largest states provides the most precision in 
the estimation given that the SIPP’s sample sizes per state become small for many states.  I also 
test the robustness of my results to two different methods for choosing control states.  While the 
synthetic control method (Abadie et al., 2010) is not directly suited to testing my hypotheses 
(given that there are multiple treatment states), I use a similar strategy to select comparable states 
by matching on California and New Jersey’s pre-policy characteristics including political 
                                                 
38 I do not cluster at the state level because, as I describe in the next section my analysis involves two policy states 
and less than 10 control states while inference with cluster-robust standard errors is based on the assumption that the 
number of clusters goes to infinity (Cameron et al., 2008).  I am able to address much of the concern posed by 
(Bertrand et al., 2004) relating to serial correlation in the state specific shocks in standard DD estimators by 
including state-by-year fixed effects.   
 26 
 
leanings, demographic make-up, and labor-force participation by gender and among women who 
give birth.  Secondly, I use other SDI states as control states (though other than New York, they 
are very small states).  Note that Texas and New York which are included in my main 
specification by the size criteria are also suggested by either the matching or SDI criteria.  The 
results are very similar across these different choices of control states.   
1.6 Estimates of the Impact of Paid-Leave Laws on Birth-Related Interruptions in 
Labor-Force Participation 
 Figure 1.5 visually builds up the empirical strategy from simple differences to the DDD.  
Recall that there are two time dimensions in the analysis: 1) time relative to a birth event, and 2) 
before and after a paid leave law is enacted.  In Panel A, I split the sample of all women who 
give birth in California or New Jersey into two groups, those who give birth before a paid leave 
law is enacted in their state, and those who give birth after the law is enacted.39  Figure 1.5.A 
plots event studies of labor-force participation around birth separately for each group.  The pre-
law group exhibits a sharper dip in participation from around six months before birth to around 4 
months after, while the post-law group exhibits a smoother interruption pattern.  The shaded area 
between the two event study lines is a DD estimate of the effect of the laws using two simple 
differences: 1) women’s change in labor-force participation between non-eligible and eligible 
periods and 2) the difference in those relative changes for groups who give birth before and after 
the law is enacted.   
 The dashed line at the bottom of Panel A plots the vertical difference between the two 
event studies: (post-law LFP) – (pre-law LFP) for each month relative to birth.  These DD 
estimates show that the laws cause a “bump” of five to eight percentage points in participation in 
the months centered around birth compared to relatively flat pre-birth and post-birth impact 
                                                 
39 Recall that there was at least a year between the passage and enactment of the laws in each state and evidence of 
publicity preceding the implementation.  
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estimates.  A joint test of significance of the coefficients on months -3 to +3 has a p-
value=0.05.40   
 Next I introduce the control states. If the DD results are due to national trends over time 
in birth-related interruptions, then the pre-post differences would falsely attribute the increase in 
labor-force participation to paid leave laws. Estimating equation (2) including women who give 
birth in other states allows me to control for trends in economic conditions that affected all 
states.  In this specification I also include state-by-year fixed effects to control for any state-
specific shocks that could be correlated with passage of the laws.    
 Panel B of Figure 1.5 repeats the dotted DD line from panel A and adds a plot of the 
coefficients on the policy interactions (𝜶𝒋) from estimating equation (2).  Pre-birth months -24 to 
-18 are omitted as the pre-birth base of comparison; the results are robust to omitting other 
combinations of months.  These DDD estimates confirm the findings of the DD that the laws 
have a statistically significant impact on labor-force participation in the six months centered on 
birth—a joint test of the significance of months -3 to +3 has a p-value=0.06.  There are small and 
insignificant impacts prior to month -6.   If the law does not draw women into the labor force in 
the pre-birth period, then the identification strategy assumes that there should be no impact of the 
law when women are not eligible, and we should expect the impact of the law 12 to 18 months 
before birth to be zero.  As discussed in Section 1.3.A, Curtis, Hirsch and Schroeder (2013) find 
a very small increase in hiring of women at future risk of leave-taking, so a small and 
insignificant estimated impact in the year before birth lends credibility to the mechanism of my 
identification strategy.41 
                                                 
40 The test is based on a specification where months -24 to -18 are omitted. 
41 As seen in Section 1.4.C, birth-related exits start to occur in the few months before birth (how early depends on 
the education level and parity of birth) which is why it makes sense to see impacts of the law in the months directly 
before birth.  I expect to see zero effects in the earlier pre-birth periods such as pre-pregnancy periods. 
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 Meanwhile there are smaller and insignificant impacts of the laws after month +6.  A 
joint test for months +12 to +18 has a p-value=0.24 with an average point estimate of five 
percentage points.  Table 1.3 summarizes the results of Figure 1.5.  California and New Jersey’s 
paid leave laws substantially reduce short-term interruptions, but my results suggest they have 
less impact on sustained interruptions.  This pattern of time-varying impacts is consistent with 
the predictions of my labor supply model.  
 Based on evidence of greater access to paid leave among more-educated women in the 
absence of the laws, I estimate equation (2) separately for women with at least a bachelor’s 
degree and women with less than a bachelor’s degree.  Figure 1.6 shows the results of this 
analysis overlaying the DDD estimates for the full sample with the results for the two education 
groups.  Figure 1.6 reveals that the impact of the laws is driven exclusively by the changes in 
labor-force participation among the less-educated women.42  Joint tests of the significance of the 
DDD coefficients from months -3 to +3 for more-educated women have a p-value=0.84, while 
the joint test for less-educated women has p-value=0.05. Table 1.3 summarizes the results of 
Figure 1.6Figure 1.6, comparing estimated impacts and significance levels before and after birth 
by education.   
 The significant bump in labor-force participation in the months directly around birth is 
the inverse of the short-term exit-and-return pattern seen for less-educated women in Figure 1.4.  
My results imply that paid leave laws reduce short-term intermittency around birth for mothers 
with less than a bachelor’s degree, making their labor-force participation profile around birth 
resemble the pattern for more-educated mothers.   
 Appendix Figure 1.2 shows DD and DDD estimates for the outcome “with a job entire 
                                                 
42 In results, not shown, I find that while the impacts are not-statistically distinguishable, the effects seem to be 
stronger for women with some college (including associate’s degrees) than among the least-educated women with at 
most a high school diploma. 
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month, worked all weeks.”  Recall that in the SIPP this category includes both women who are 
actually working and those on paid leave (see footnote 29).  These results show that paid leave 
laws give rise to a similar bump around birth in the proportion of less-educated women who have 
a paying job, which indicates that the increase in labor-force participation shown in Figure 1.5 is 
largely driven by increased attachment to jobs. 
1.7  Conclusion  
This paper estimates the impact of recent state-level paid parental leave laws on women’s 
birth-related career interruptions using the high-frequency longitudinal structure of the SIPP. 
Exploiting observations on a month-to-month basis, my results show that short-duration paid 
parental leave substantially reduces the incidence of short-term labor-force exits occurring in the 
seven months centered around birth but has less impact on longer-term interruptions.  Results for 
the impact of the laws on the proportion of women with a paying job indicate that this represents 
an increased attachment to jobs.  These impacts are only present for mothers with less than a 
college degree who are less likely to have access to private paid leave in the absence of a 
mandate. 
If parental leave is a benefit valued by workers then, in the absence of market failures, we 
would expect leave to part be of an optimal compensation package voluntarily negotiated 
between workers and employers obviating the need for a mandate.  There may be market failures 
including externalities in terms of child outcomes or a coordination problem among hiring firms 
that lead to suboptimal parental leave provision in a competitive market.43  
If, as advocates claim, firms benefit from lower employee turnover costs when they offer 
leave, there may be countervailing forces to overcome these potential market failures.  As shown 
in Section 1.2.B, access to privately-negotiated leave has increased substantially for some 
                                                 
43 These potential market failures are discussed in detail in Ruhm (1998). 
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women since the 1980s implying that the joint value of leave is captured by some firms and 
workers without a mandate.  The fact that voluntary paid leave is predominantly seen in high-
education jobs suggests that market failures continue to prevail in low-education sectors, or low-
skill workers do not value the benefits and/or employers of low-skill workers do not sufficiently 
value retaining them. 
The substantial impact of paid leave I find among less-educated women indicates that they do 
value parental leave but may not be able to afford unpaid leave or are not able to bargain for paid 
leave in the absence of a mandate.  This could have implications for the distribution of earnings 
across education if increased attachment to the labor-force leads to greater tenure with 
employers, increased accumulated experience and long-term earnings growth.  If these follow-on 
gains to increased attachment accrue to the women impacted by the new paid leave laws in 
California and New Jersey, it could imply that the mandate corrects a market failure.  If, on the 
other hand, there are no gains from increased attachment, the mandates could lead to distortions 
like statistical discrimination against women whom employers perceive as at risk for leave-
taking.  This could lead to less hiring of women, fewer promotions, and flatter wage profiles. 
 The findings of this paper about the short and medium-term labor supply impacts of 
short-duration paid leave, thus, take an important step in understanding the costs and benefits of 
these policies and suggest longer-term outcomes that will be useful to analyze as time since 
implementation increases.   
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Figure 1.1.1. Use of Paid Parental Leave after First Births 
 
 















At Least Bachelor's 








At Least Bachelor's 
Less Than Bachelor's 
Notes: The figures show trends in of paid leave usage in the 12 weeks after a first 
birth among women who worked during pregnancy as reported in SIPP 
retrospective fertility modules in the 1996, 2001, 2004 and 2008 SIPP panels.  The 
survey question refers to “maternity” rather than “parental” leave.  “Any paid 
leave” includes the following categories: paid maternity leave, paid sick leave, paid 










































Figure 1.3. Labor-Supply Responses to the Introduction of Paid Parental Leave: Four Cases 
 
 
Figure 1.3.1 Figure 1.3.2 





































-24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Months Relative to Birth
First Births
-24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Months Relative to Birth
Higher Order Births
Notes: The figure shows the level of labor-force participation by parity and mother’s education for women age 18-45 
who gave birth in the 2004 and 2008 SIPP panels.  Each line plots coefficients on month-relative-to-birth dummies 
added back to the average level of participation a year prior to birth—these are the 𝛿𝑗 coefficients (added back to the 
level of participation in the omitted period (m=-12)) from estimating equation (1) with a dependent variable an 













































-24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Months Relative to Birth
Notes: The figure shows changes in labor-force participation around 
birth by mother’s education for women who gave birth in the 2004 and 
2008 panels.  In this figure, first- and higher-order births are pooled.  By 
plotting the coefficients on month-relative-to-birth dummies with the 
month -12 omitted, the level of participation is normalized to zero at one 
year prior to birth.  These are the 𝛿𝑗 coefficients from estimating 
equation (1) with a dependent variable and indicator for being in the 
labor force.  Year fixed effects are included in this specification and I use 





Figure 1.5. Impact of CA and NJ Paid Leave Laws on Labor-Force                        
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Post - Pre: DD

































-24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Months Relative to Birth
Post - Pre
DDD: All Mothers
B. Triple-Difference Event-Study Estimates
Joint test of DDD months -3 to +3: 
P-value = 0.06 
Notes: Panel A shows the level of labor-force participation in the months relative to 
birth for women giving birth pre- and post-policy in California and New Jersey.  The 
dotted line plots the monthly differences between participation in the pre- and post-




Notes to Figure 5 continued: 
participation. Panel B repeats the DD estimates from Panel A, and plots DDD estimates, which are 
coefficients on the interaction between the month-relative-to-birth and an indicator for giving birth in a 
policy state after the law was enacted. These are the 𝛼𝑗 coefficients from estimating equation (2) with 
the dependent variable an indicator for being in the labor force. The regression includes year, state, and 
state-by-year fixed effects as described in Section V.B.  Months -24 to -18 are omitted as the pre-birth 
comparison period (hence the shaded markers for these months).  SIPP sampling weights are used. The 
sample for DDD estimates is women giving birth in California and New Jersey and the control states 
as described in Table 2.  Table 3 provides a summary of these results with average point estimates and 
significance levels in before- and after-birth periods 
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-24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Months Relative to Birth
DDD: All Mothers
DDD: At Least Bachelor's
DDD: Less Than Bachelor's
Joint tests of DDD months -3 to +3: 
At Least Bachelor’s P-value = 0.82 
Less than Bachelor’s P-value = 0.05 
Notes: The figure plots DDD estimates separately by mother’s level of education, 
which are coefficients on the interaction between the month-relative-to-birth and an 
indicator for giving birth in a policy state after the law was enacted.  These are the 𝛼𝑗 
coefficients from estimating equation (2) with the dependent variable an indicator for 
being in the labor force.  The regression includes year, state, and state-by-year fixed 
effects as described in Section V.B.  Months -24 to -18 are omitted in as the pre-birth 
comparison period (hence the shaded markers for these months). SIPP sampling 
weights are used. The sample for DDD estimates is women giving birth in the policy 
states—California and New Jersey—and the control states as described in Table 2.  
Table 3 provides a summary of these results with average point estimates and 




Table 1.1. Administrative Records on Claims for Paid Parental Leave 
2004/05 2011/2012 2010 2011
Bonding Claims 132,007    183,421     23,696      24,413      
   % of claims made 
              by women 83% 71% 89% 87%
Average weekly benefit $409 $497 $486 $489
Average weeks per claim 4.8 5.35 5.2 5.3
Total Paid (millions) $263.45 $467.57 $60.40 $63.20
Number of births in State 544,843    502,120     106,922    105,883    
% of births in the state 







Notes: Source: Claims data: New Jersey:  http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/fli/fliindex.html   
California:  http://www.edd.ca.gov/disability/paid_family_leave.htm; birth data: National 
Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Reports 2004, 2010, 2011.   




Table 1.2. Summary of Paid Leave Birth Sample 
Pre Post Total Control States
California 794 497 1,291
New Jersey 273 46 319
Total 1,067 543 1,610 2,126
Pre Post Total Control States
California 614 362 976
New Jersey 167 26 193
Total 781 388 1,169 1,577
Pre Post Total Control States
California 180 135 315
New Jersey 106 20 126
Total 286 155 441 654
Full Birth Sample
Less than Bachelor's Degree
At Least a Bachelor's Degree






Notes: The sample includes all women age 18 to 45 who give birth in the 
1996, 2001, 2004 and 2008 SIPP panels.  Pre and Post refer to whether the 
birth occurred before or after the paid leave law was enacted in the 
respective state.  Control states are New York, Texas and Florida. Pre and 
post are not listed for the control states as the laws are enacted on different 




Table 1.3. Summary of Triple-Difference Impacts of CA and NJ                                               






-16 to -10 -3 to +3  +12 to +18
All Mothers
Average DDD impact 0.03 0.09 0.05
P-value of joint test 0.21 0.06 0.24
P-value of difference vs -3 to +3 0.11 NA 0.33
Bachelor's Plus
Average DDD impact -0.01 0.00 -0.03
P-value of joint test 0.76 0.84 0.34
P-value of difference vs -3 to +3 0.90 NA 0.67
Less than Bachelor's
Average DDD impact 0.03 0.09 0.03
P-value of joint test 0.33 0.05 0.36
P-value of difference vs -3 to +3 0.25 NA 0.28  
 
  Notes: The table summarizes the monthly DDD results shown in Figures 1.5 and 
1.6—see notes to Figures 1.5 and 1.6 for a description of the estimates.  Each 
column summarizes the estimated impacts for a 7-month period: 1) pre-pregnancy, 
2) directly around the month of birth, 3) longer-term post-birth.  For each time 
period, rows give 1) the average of the monthly point estimates, 2) the p-value of a 
test of the joint significance of the monthly estimates in the period, and 3) a test of 
the significance of the difference of the estimates during the period compared to the 
impact in months -3 to +3.      
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Appendix Figure 1.1. Changes in Labor-Force Participation around Birth: Women with at 






At Least Bachelor's: 2000s Panels































-24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Months Relative to Birth
Notes: The figure compares birth-related interruptions in labor-force participation in 
the 1980s to the 2000s for women with at least a bachelor’s degree.  The lines are 
plots of  𝛿𝑗 coefficients from equation(1) with dependent variable an indicator for 
being in the labor force, estimated separately by decade for women with at least a 
bachelor’s degree giving birth at ages 18-45 in the 1984, 1985, 1986,  2004 & 2008 
SIPP panels.  Year fixed effects are included in this specification and I use SIPP 




Appendix Figure 1.2. Impact of CA and NJ Paid Leave Laws  
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Months Relative to Birth
Post Policy w/ Job
Pre Policy w/ Job
Difference
Post - Pre: DD





























-24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Months Relative to Birth
DDD: At Least Bachelor's
DDD: Less Than Bachelor's
B. Triple-Difference Event-Study Estimates (by Education)
Notes: The outcome in this figure is the whether a woman was “with a job entire 
month, working all weeks.”  In the SIPP, women who are on paid (but not unpaid) 
leave are given this code as well as women actually working.       




Pooled 2004, 2008 
Dates
Births to women age 18-45 6,284 3,670
       First births 2,621 41.7% 1,987 54.1%
Higer-order births 3,663 58.3% 1,683 45.9%
Panel B
Race 
   White 3,964 59.5% 3,035 84.3%
   Black 760 13.1% 491 15.7%
   Hispanic 1,039 19.3%
   Other 521 8.1%
Marital Status
   Married Sps present 4,218 69.4% 2,944 80.5%
   Separated, Div, Wid 426 5.8% 249 6.6%
   Never Married 1,640 24.8% 477 13.0%
Education
   Less than Bachelors 4,377 68.9% 3,054 83.1%
       High School or less 2,363 37.1% 1,809 49.2%
       Some College 2,014 31.8% 1,245 33.9%
   Bachelors Only 1,305 21.2% 386 10.5%
   Masters Plus 602 9.9% 230 6.4%
        Masters 450 7.4%
        Professional 89 1.4%
        PhD 63 1.0%
    At Least Bachelors 1,907 31.1% 616 16.9%
NA
NA
Appendix Table 1.1 Summary of Birth Sample from SIPP Panels
Pooled 1984-86
2000s 1980s






Notes:  In Panel B numbers of observations are shown while percentages in each 
category are calculated using SIPP sampling weights.  The Census Bureau changed 
survey question over time: the 1980's panels do not give information on Hispanic 
origin. Ambiguity in 1980s coding of education variables makes it impossible to make 
an exact distinction between some college, bachelor’s and graduate degree. 
Measurement error in defining levels of higher education and challenges in reconciling 
old and new census bureau education questions are well documented (Jaeger 1997, 
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Chapter 2  
 
Fertility and Family Well-being Effects of an Aggressive Family Planning Policy in 
Peru in the 1990's: A Reweighting Estimator with a Contaminated Treatment Group 
Approach 
 
With Italo Gutierrez 
Abstract: In the mid-1990’s President Fujimori of Peru initiated an aggressive family planning 
program with the stated purpose of addressing widespread poverty. While female sterilization 
was an official element of the program, anecdotal evidence suggests that health workers were 
secretly given large sterilization quotas and reportedly used bribes, coercion, and even force to 
meet them. While the details of the program were not public, the Peruvian Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) provide evidence of a large increase in sterilizations during the suspected 
program window. We address three research questions: First, who was affected by the 
sterilization program? Second, what was the impact of the program on fertility? Third, what, if 
any, impact did the program have on household well-being? We use a rich set of controls from 
the DHS with a reweighting procedure modified to account for a “contaminated” treatment group 
in order to estimate the effects of the sterilization program. We find substantial impacts of the 
program on fertility, but small or insignificant impacts on other household outcomes. Thus, our 
results suggest that the mere reduction of fertility may not be associated with improvements in 
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 In the mid-1990’s President Fujimori of Peru initiated an aggressive family planning 
program with the stated purpose of addressing widespread poverty in the country. The 1991-
1992 Peruvian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS II) provided evidence that seemed to 
bolster Fujimori’s claim that there was a “the vicious circle [of] poverty--unwanted child--
poverty” in Peru.1  Table 2.1, based on data from DHS II, shows the strong negative correlation 
between wealth (and education) and fertility in Peru. The Peruvian DHS II also indicated an 
unmet need for contraception with 35 percent of all women who gave birth within the last five 
years responding that their latest birth was not wanted; this percentage of unwanted last births 
increases to 65 percent among women with three or more children. Against this backdrop, 
Fujimori’s plan initially had support from the United Nations (UNFPA), USAID and NGOs, if 
not from powerful conservative religious forces within Peru. By early 1998, however, claims of 
sterilizations performed on poor rural women without consent had caused a political uproar in 
Peru and the controversy spread to the international community. Tubal ligation, a form of female 
sterilization, was a publicly stated element of the program, but anecdotal evidence suggests that 
health workers were given large sterilization quotas and often used “bribes,” coercion, and even 
physical force to meet them. 2 
 Sterilization quotas were not officially reported by the Fujimori administration and there 
were no publicly stated guidelines about which populations were targeted by the sterilization 
campaign. However, Peruvian Demographic and Health Surveys collected in 2000 (DHS IV) and 
                                                 
1 Address by President Alberto Fujimori at the United Nations, New York, 1999. 
2 A report by Guilia Tamayo from the NGO Flora Tristan published in 1999 provides evidence based on interviews 
with sterilized women and investigations of rural “health festivals.” The post-Fujimori government of Alejandro 
Toledo also produced reports documenting human rights violations under the Fujimori sterilization program. The 
Toledo government was, however, reported to be opposed to birth control in general on religious grounds (Boesten, 
2007, Vasquez del Aguila, 2006).  
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2004-2008 (DHS V) asked respondents about their current form of contraception and the date 
they initiated use.3  Figure 2.1 shows a dramatic spike in female sterilizations in 1996 and 1997 
and an equally dramatic fall by 1998 when the controversy erupted. We will consider 1996-1997 
to be the policy window for our analysis.4  Based on United Nations age-and gender-specific 
population tables, we estimate that the DHS reports of sterilization from 1996 to 1997 imply that 
nearly 172,000 women were sterilized in those two years--close to 5 percent of Peruvian women 
aged 25-49. If we consider the relevant population to be poor women, as reported, the proportion 
sterilized is much higher.  
 In this paper we will address three main research questions. Our first goal is to 
understand who was affected by the Fujimori sterilization policy using the nationally 
representative random sample of women in the DHS. The second aim of the paper is to estimate 
the causal impact of the policy on fertility: How many fewer children were born due to the 
policy? Third, we attempt to understand what, if any, impact a reduction in the counterfactual 
number of children had on women’s employment and on household well-being for those affected 
by the policy using DHS IV to measure outcomes three years after the policy and DHS V to 
measure outcomes seven to eleven years after the policy. We tackle these questions sequentially, 
with each stage feeding into the next.  We carefully outline the assumptions behind causal 
identification at each stage. We also attempt to explore and sign any potential bias in our 
estimates. We continue to conduct robustness checks that test the assumptions and credibility of 
our causal claims.  
 
                                                 
3 The Demographic and Health Surveys are cross-sectional surveys. So that DHS IV and DHS V do not represent 
waves of a panel, but rather repeated cross sections. 
4 This evidence from the DHS on the timing of the policy is corroborated by Tamayo (1999) and post-Fujimori 
Health Ministry reports.   
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 There is considerable debate about the causal direction of the correlation between poverty 
and family size in developing countries like Peru. Fujimori’s own claim of a “vicious circle” 
points directly to the simultaneity—endogeneity— inherent in the study of the link between 
family planning and economic development. However, credible evidence is vitally important 
since Fujimori’s logic that Peru needed to reduce family size in order to eliminate poverty was 
the driving force behind a policy that lead to serious human rights violations. The challenges to 
identification in evaluating population programs are elaborated in recent papers by (Schultz, 
2005) and (Moffitt, 2005). Both of these papers highlight the difficulties of establishing 
causation in population research, but also the great policy importance of accepting these 
challenges, being honest and clear about assumptions, and seeking out mechanisms that can 
explain observed behaviors.  
 There are at least two major challenges specific to the Peruvian sterilization campaign 
that we must tackle in order to understand who was affected by the policy and then take the next 
step of identifying the policy’s impacts. First, the details of the policy were secret. Second, there 
was a non-trivial and slightly increasing rate of female sterilization prior to the advent of the 
1996-1997 Fujimori sterilization policy as can be seen in Figure 2.1. This underlying rate of 
sterilization likely continued during the policy, but we are unable to distinguish directly in the 
data which women would have been sterilized anyway, and which were sterilized because of the 
policy. We suspect that sterilizations that were not caused by the policy were voluntary. If some 
underlying level of sterilization continued during 1996-1997, simply looking at all sterilizations 
that occurred during the policy window will conflate the impact of potentially voluntary and 
potentially coerced sterilizations—impacts that we suspect may be quite different. Our 
methodology aims to tackle both of these challenges using the rich information in the DHS to 
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forensically uncover the characteristics of the population that was targeted by the policy. We use 
the complete birth histories and detailed geographic information available in the DHS along with 
timing of sterilization to construct a reweighting estimator along the lines of   DiNardo et al. 
(1996). Our estimator of the treatment effect of the policy is modified, however, to account for 
the fact that the group of all women who were sterilized during the policy make up a 
“contaminated” treatment group--in the data we know who was sterilized during the policy 
period, but among these women we do not know who was treated by the policy. 
 There is evidence based on hundreds of interviews that women were tricked, pressured, 
and even physically forced into sterilization procedures in 1996 and 1997 (Tamayo 1999). 
However, in our data we cannot determine any level of coercion or force during the policy. 
Furthermore, we cannot confirm that sterilizations that occurred outside of the policy were 
voluntary. Therefore, going forward, we refrain from using the terms “voluntary” and “coerced” 
or “forced,” and we distinguish, rather, between sterilizations that we predict would have 
occurred even in the absence of the program, and those that were caused by the 1996-1997 
policy.  Given that our methodology is based on predictions of which women were in each 
category, we are further able to tackle the question of whether the impact of sterilization was 
different among women targeted by the policy compared to women whose sterilizations were not 
caused by the policy. 
 We find that women targeted by the Fujimori sterilization policy were on average 31 
years old, had four children at the time of sterilization, and 5.6 years of schooling. We estimate 
that roughly half of the women treated by the policy lived in rural areas and a quarter were from 
rural mountain regions, but we also find that a significant proportion of treated women came 
from urban coastal areas like Lima. We estimate that being sterilized by the policy led these 
 54 
 
women to have 0.33 fewer children by 2000, and 0.85 fewer children by 2004. We find small 
and marginally significant impacts of the policy on women's and children's outcomes, with the 
exception of statistically significant improvements in the height for age and school enrollment of 
daughters of treated women.  
 The counterfactual comparisons we use in our estimation procedure rely on the 
assumption that all of the factors that lead women to be sterilized by the policy are observed and 
that we have properly controlled for them. This is a strong assumption, one that we continue to 
examine. For example, we might be concerned that women who were observationally the same 
as women sterilized by the policy, but who were not sterilized were different in unobserved ways 
that are correlated with fertility. In particular, we may worry that they are women who had a 
greater desire for additional children than those who succumbed to the policy. The DHS surveys 
asked women about the wantedness of all pregnancies in the past five years. We compare 
responses to these questions in DHS IV between the treatment and control groups created by 
reweighting and find that the percentages of women who wanted (or did not want) their last 
pregnancy are not identical, but the reweighting improves the match considerably.5  We are 
encouraged by these results and think this is suggestive evidence that while we are matching on 
observed characteristics, our treatment and control group may also match on unobserved 
characteristics.  
2.2 Methodology to Forensically Estimate the Impact of the Fujimori Sterilization Policy 
 Our goal is to estimate the effect of being sterilized by the Fujimori Sterilization Policy 
(FSP) on fertility and on measures of family well-being. Estimating who was treated by the 
                                                 
5 We only make this comparison for women who had pregnancies in the last five years but before the policy. This 
restriction is necessitated by the range of data available and our desire to make a proper counterfactual comparison, 
but limits the sample size. Details can be found in Table 2. 
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policy is a crucial first step in accomplishing this goal. This is not the usual first step in treatment 
effects estimation, but it is required in this case because of the secrecy of the policy and the 
nature of the information we have about sterilized women. Recall, that we know if a woman was 
sterilized and when she was sterilized. However, we suspect that some of the women sterilized 
during the policy period were not treated by the policy--they would have been sterilized anyway. 
In other words, our information on who was sterilized during the policy period is contaminated 
information on treatment status. Finally, treatment was assigned based on criteria that are not 
publicly available and those criteria were likely far from random assignment. To motivate the 
modifications we make to the standard treatment effects estimation, we will begin by outlining 
the methods we would use if we had either “ideal” data or at least a more typical amount of 
information about a policy.  
 We will use notation standard in the treatment effects literature. We define an indicator 
𝑆 to denote whether a woman is sterilized, and an indicator 𝐷 to denote if a woman is sterilized 
(treated) by a sterilization policy. We assume that each woman has two potential outcomes, 𝑌0 if 
she is not treated and 𝑌1 if she is treated. We only ever observe one of these potential outcomes, 
but we are able estimate the average treatment effect on the treated, 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑖0|𝐷 = 1] =E[Y1 |D = 1] − E[Yi0|D = 1], under different assumptions given the type of data available and 
the way treatment was assigned.  
 Random assignment allows the most straightforward estimation strategy. If the only 
sterilizations that took place during the policy period were those caused by the policy and 
sterilizations were randomly assigned (and furthermore we had data on who was sterilized), we 
would simply compare the outcomes of sterilized women to those of non-sterilized women. In 
this case 𝑆 = 𝐷 and 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷 = 1] is observed--the average outcome among sterilized women. 
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The average outcome among non-sterilized women 𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝐷 = 0] would be an unbiased estimate 
of 𝐸[𝑌𝑖0}|𝐷 = 1]because of random assignment. If there were other sterilizations occurring but 
we knew who was sterilized by the policy, we would not always have 𝑆 = 𝐷 but we would apply 
the analysis to all women not previously sterilized.  
 Now consider a scenario where sterilizations were not randomly assigned, but that the 
only sterilizations taking place were caused by the policy (and we know who was sterilized). 
Again in this case 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷 = 1] is observed. But now without random assignment of the 
treatment, the average outcome of non-sterilized women is no longer an acceptable 
counterfactual. However, if we believe that we observe all of the characteristics that lead to 
selection into treatment, we can use those factors to estimate 𝐸[𝑌𝑖0|𝐷 = 1] using the non-
sterilized population. This could be done with ordinary least squares using a treatment dummy 
and the necessary controls. Propensity score methods like matching and reweighting would rely 
on estimating the probability of treatment based on observable characteristics of treated women. 
Both methods rely on the assumption of selection into treatment on observables and both use the 
characteristics of the treated group to create a counterfactual comparison group among the non-
treated that resembles the treated group. If there were other sterilizations occurring during the 
policy period, but we knew which women were sterilized by the policy, the same analysis would 
be conducted by simply removing women sterilized outside of the program from the sample.6  
 In all of the scenarios described above, 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷 = 1] is observed and the researcher only 
needs to think of how to find an unbiased estimate of 𝐸[𝑌𝑖0|𝐷 = 1]. In our case, we do not 
directly observe 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷 = 1] because we do not observe 𝐷. So we must estimate both 
                                                 
6 We focus on a propensity score based reweighting method as it makes the intuition of our process more clear and 
the weights we create allow us to show the characteristics of the women we hypothesize were in the different 
categories. In this way we can infer from our analysis who was affected by the policy--the first of our research goals. 
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𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷 = 1] and 𝐸[𝑌𝑖0|𝐷 = 1]. We will use the rich information available in the DHS on birth 
and martial histories, geographic and demographic characteristics of women sterilized both 
before and during the policy to separately identify treated women from women who would have 
been sterilized in the absence of the program. We will use the information in the DHS to estimate 
propensity scores for probability of sterilization and proceed with a reweighting strategy. The 
next subsection describes the assumptions and modifications to standard reweighting techniques 
that allow us to estimate both 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷 = 1]and 𝐸[𝑌𝑖0|𝐷 = 1]--the elements necessary to find the 
average treatment effect on the treated.  
2.2.A A Modified Reweighting Strategy 
2.2.A.i Notation and relevant probabilities 
 We begin by modifying the notation outlined above to accommodate the unique features 
of our identification strategy. Because we will distinguish between sterilizations that occurred 
before and during the policy, we now define an indicator variable 𝑆𝑡 to denote whether a woman 
is sterilized during a given period. A woman who is sterilized in period t will have a value of one 
for 𝑆𝑡 and a value of zero otherwise i.e. 𝑠𝑡 ∈ {0,1}.7 The index 𝑡 ∈ { 1,2}equals one if the time 
period is prior to the FSP time period (1990-1994), and equals two if the time period coincides 
with the FSP time window (1996-1997).8  Since sterilization is a permanent one-time procedure, 
a woman can only have 𝑆𝑡 = 1 in one of the periods.9  We are mute regarding sterilizations that 
happened after the FSP was dismantled. In other words, we assume that they would have 
happened regardless of the FSP and thus are included in our control groups. 
                                                 
7 As is conventional, capital letters denote random variables and small letters denote specific realizations of those 
random variables. 
8 We leave out the calendar year 1995 because it is possible that the FSP might have started in the later part of that 
year.  
9 In the data we do not find any sterilized women who give birth after the date they report being sterilized.   
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 Our treatment of interest is sterilization by the FSP, denoted by 𝐷,𝑑𝑡 ∈ { 0,1}. Women 
who were sterilized because of the FSP have a value of one for 𝐷, and women who were not 
sterilized or whose sterilizations were not caused by the FSP have a value of zero. Thus, a 
woman who was sterilized in 1997 by the FSP would have 𝑆1 = 0, 𝑆2 = 1,𝐷 = 1 and a woman 
who was sterilized during the FSP window but would have been sterilized regardless of the 
policy would have 𝑆1 = 0, 𝑆2 = 1,𝐷 = 0.10  Finally, we denote other observed variables by 𝑋.  
 Now we define a series of probabilities we will use in our estimation strategy and the 
assumptions required to estimate them given our data. Equation gives the probability of a woman 
with observed characteristics 𝑥, becoming sterilized during the FSP time period (given that she 
was not sterilized before), 
𝑷(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙) = 𝑷(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏,𝑫 = 𝟎|𝑿 = 𝒙) + 𝑷(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏,𝑫 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙) = 𝑷(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏,𝑫 = 𝟎|𝑿 = 𝒙) + 𝑷(𝑫 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙)                                  (2. 1) 
 
The first equality holds because 𝐷 = 0 and 𝐷 = 1 are mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive events. The second equality holds because 𝑆2 = 1 for all cases where 𝐷 = 1. 
Assumption 1 below allows us to exploit the information we have about women prior to the FSP. 
Assumption 1: The probability of a woman being sterilized during the policy period who would 
have been sterilized even in the absence of the policy is the same as the probability of 
sterilization before the FSP was implemented for a woman with similar observable 
characteristics (𝑋).11  In other words we assume that 
                                                 
10 Other relevant categories are women who were sterilized prior to the FSP who would have 𝑆_1 = 1,𝑆2 = 0,𝐷 =0 and women who were never sterilized by the end of the FSP would have 𝑆1 = 0, 𝑆2 = 0 and obviously 𝐷 = 0. 
11 We allow for a time trend in our estimation to capture the underlying national trend in sterilization take-up prior to 
the implementation of the FSP.   
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                                   𝑷(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏,𝑫 = 𝟎|𝑿 = 𝒙) = 𝑷(𝑺𝟏 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙)                                 (2. 2) 
Under Assumption 1 we can re-write Equation (2.1) to express the probability of being treated 
as:                     𝑷(𝑫 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙) = 𝑷(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙) − 𝑷(𝑺𝟏 = 𝟏, |𝑿 = 𝒙)                           ( 2. 3)       
 
 To simplify notation we re-write the probability of sterilization in the pre-policy period 
for a woman with observed characteristics x as 𝑃1(𝑥) and the probability of sterilization during 
the FSP as 𝑃2(𝑥).12 Thus Equation (2.3) becomes 
                                           𝑷(𝑫 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙) = 𝑷𝟐(𝒙) − 𝑷𝟏(𝒙)                                           (2. 4) = ∆𝑷(𝒙) 
 
 We can also define the probability of being treated conditional on being sterilized during 
the FSP time period 
                           𝑷(𝑫 = 𝟏|𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏,𝑿 = 𝒙) = 𝑷(𝑫 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙)𝑷(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙) =  ∆𝑷(𝒙)𝑷𝟐(𝒙)                              (2. 5) 
  
 Finally, we modify our notation regarding the potential outcome of interest 𝑌𝑑, where 𝑑 
indexes the state of the treatment variable 𝐷. The outcome that is realized (and observed) is 𝑌, 
which is not indexed by 𝑑. Since we do not know who was sterilized by the FSP (treated) and 
who would have been sterilized even in the absence of the FSP (non-treated) among women who 
were sterilized during the years 1996-1997 (i.e. 𝑆2 = 1) the observational rule is modified from 
the standard case. Equation (2.6) gives the modified expression for the observed outcome in 
terms of the relevant potential outcomes 
                                                 
12 𝑃2(𝑥) and 𝑃1(𝑥) can be estimated in the data using a probit or a logit, and can be thought of as the propensity 
scores used in matching and weighting estimators. 
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𝒀 = 𝒔𝟐[𝒅𝒀𝟏 + (𝟏 − 𝒅)𝒀𝟎] + (𝟏 − 𝒔𝟐)𝒀𝟎                                                            𝒀 = 𝒔𝟐𝒀� + (𝟏 − 𝒔𝟐)𝒀𝟎                                                           (2. 6)    
 
The term 𝑌� = [𝑑𝑌1 + (1 − 𝑑)𝑌0] highlights the fact that not all women sterilized from 1996-
1997 were treated by the policy. In other words, 𝑌�  represents the outcomes of the contaminated 
treatment group. 
 As discussed above, our goal is to estimate average treatment effect on the treated, i.e. the 
impact of the sterilization on those women who were sterilized by the FSP: 
                                                 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌1−0|𝐷 = 1] = E[Y1|D = 1] − E[Y0|D = 1]                                           (2. 7)        
   
2.2.A.ii Reweighting approach to deal with a contaminated treatment group 
 Given our observational rule in Equation (2.6), we cannot directly estimate the first term 
of Equation (2.7), 𝐸[𝑌1|𝐷 = 1]. However, note that 
                                                      𝑬�𝒀��𝑫 = 𝟏� = 𝑬[𝒀𝟏|𝑫 = 𝟏]                                           (2. 8)   
 We observe 𝑌�  for women sterilized during the FSP period (𝑆2 = 1) and we can use the 
probabilities derived above to estimate 𝐸[𝑌�|𝐷 = 1], under certain assumptions. Note that 
                                    𝑬�𝒀��𝑫 = 𝟏� = �𝒚�𝒇(𝒚�|𝑫 = 𝟏)𝒅𝒚� = �𝒚�𝒇(𝒚�,𝒙|𝑫 = 𝟏)𝒅𝒙𝒅𝒚�                                          
If we multiply and divide the integrand by 𝑓(𝑦�, 𝑥|𝑆2 = 1) and then apply Bayes Rule to the 
numerator and denominator we get  
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  𝑬�𝒀��𝑫 = 𝟏� = �𝒚� 𝒇(𝒚�,𝒙|𝑫 = 𝟏)
𝒇(𝒚�,𝒙|𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏)𝒇(𝒚�,𝒙|𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏)𝒅𝒙𝒅𝒚�                                         (2. 9) = �𝒚�𝒇(𝒚�,𝒙|𝑫 = 𝟏)𝒇(𝒚�,𝒙)𝒇(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏)
𝒇(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏|𝒚�,𝒙)𝒇(𝒚�,𝒙)𝒇(𝑫 = 𝟏)𝒇(𝒚�,𝒙|𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏)𝒅𝒙𝒅𝒚�    
 Next we introduce the standard assumption in matching estimators: 
Assumption 2: Strong Ignorability Assumption. We assume that after conditioning on 𝑋 the 
probability of being treated and of being sterilized during the years of the FSP are independent of 
the potential outcomes {𝑌0,𝑌1} and, thus, they are also independent of 𝑌� . In other words, and 
invoking equation (2.4), we assume that 
           𝒇(𝑫 = 𝟏|𝒚𝟎,𝒚𝟏,𝒙) = 𝒇(𝑫 = 𝟏|𝒚�,𝒙) = 𝒇(𝑫 = 𝟏, |𝒙) = ∆ 𝑷(𝒙) 
𝒇(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏|𝒚𝟎,𝒚𝟏,𝒙) = 𝒇(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏|𝒚�,𝒙) = 𝒇(𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏|𝒙) = 𝑷𝟐(𝒙)                  (2. 10) 
 
Using Assumption 2 we can re-express equation (2.9) as 
                 𝐸[𝑌��𝐷 = 1] = 𝑓(𝑆2 = 1)
𝑓(𝐷 = 1) �𝑦� 𝑓(𝐷 = 1|𝑥)𝑓(𝑆2 = 1|𝑥)𝑓(𝑦�, 𝑥|𝑆2 = 1)𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦� = 𝑃(𝑆2 = 1)
𝑃(𝐷 = 1) �𝑦� ∆𝑃(𝑥)𝑃2(𝑥)  𝑓(𝑦�, 𝑥|𝑆2 = 1)𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦�                       (2. 11)            
Since we have a sample from 𝑓(𝑦�, 𝑥|𝑆2 = 1) we can estimate the expected value in  
Equation (2.11) with the finite sample estimator: 13 
                                                 
13 The finite sample estimator of Equation (2.11) is given by: 
𝐸[𝑌�𝑎�𝐷 = 1] = 𝑃�(𝑆2 = 1)�
𝑃�(𝐷 = 1) ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝜔𝑖𝑠2𝑖𝑁𝑖=1∑ 𝑠2𝑖𝑁𝑖=1  
However, note that the population value 𝑃
�(𝑆2=1)�
𝑃�(𝐷=1)  can be approximated in finite samples by �∑ 𝑦𝑖𝜔𝑖𝑠2𝑖𝑁𝑖=1∑ 𝑠2𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 �−1, which 
gives the expression in Equation (12). 
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                          𝐸[𝑌�|𝐷 = 1]� = 𝐸�𝑌1|𝐷 = 1� � = ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝜔1𝑖𝑠2𝑖𝑁𝑖=1∑ 𝜔1𝑖𝑠2𝑖𝑁𝑖=1                                 (2. 12) 
                                                     𝜔1𝑖 = ∆𝑃(𝑥𝚤) �
𝑃2(𝑋𝚤)� × 𝜙𝑖                                                       (2. 13)    
Where 𝜙𝑖  is the DHS sampling weight of woman 𝑖. Thus, the expected value 𝐸[𝑌1|𝐷 = 1] is a 
weighted average of the observed outcome, 𝑌, for women who were sterilized during the FSP 
time period. The weights are proportional to the probability that, conditional on being sterilized 
during that period, the woman was a induced to be sterilized by the policy (see Equation (2.5)). 
 Invoking the strong ignorability assumption described by Assumption 2 and following 
similar steps as before, it can be shown that 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] is given by: 
𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] = �𝑦0𝑓(𝑦0|𝐷 = 1)𝑑𝑦0 = �𝑦0𝑓(𝑦0, 𝑥|𝐷 = 1)𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦0                                                                         (2. 14)    
= �𝑦0 𝑓(𝑦0, 𝑥|𝐷 = 1)𝑓(𝑦0, 𝑥|𝑆2 = 0)𝑓(𝑦0, 𝑥|𝑆2 = 0)𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦0                                                   = �𝑦0 𝑓(𝐷 = 1|𝑦0, 𝑥)𝑓(𝑦0, 𝑥)𝑓(𝑆2 = 0)𝑓(𝑇 = 0, 𝑆 = 0|𝑦0, 𝑥)𝑓(𝑦0, 𝑥)𝑓(𝐷 = 1)𝑓(𝑦0, 𝑥|𝑆2 = 0)𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦0 = 𝑃(𝑆2 = 0)
𝑃(𝐷 = 1) �𝑦0 ∆𝑃(𝑥)1 − 𝑃2(𝑥) f(y0, x|S2 = 0)dxdy0                              
And the sample estimator is given by: 
                             𝑬�𝒀𝟎|𝑫 = 𝟏� � = ∑ 𝒚𝒊𝝎𝟎𝒊(𝟏 − 𝒔𝟐𝒊)𝑵𝒊=𝟏∑ 𝝎𝟎𝒊(𝟏 − 𝒔𝟐𝒊)𝑵𝒊=𝟏                                             (2. 15)     𝝎𝟎𝒊 = ∆𝑷(𝒙𝒊)�
𝟏−𝑷𝟐(𝒙𝒊)� × 𝝓𝒊                                                    (2. 16)         
 63 
 
Thus, the expected value 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] is a weighted average of the observed outcome, 𝑌, for 
women who were not sterilized during the FSP time period, where the weights allow us to 
construct a counterfactual control group for the treated group. We can re-write the weights to 
give them a clearer interpretation: 
                                               𝝎𝟎𝒊 = 𝑷𝟐(𝒙𝒊)�
𝟏−𝑷𝟐(𝒙𝒊)� × ∆𝑷(𝒙𝒊)�𝑷𝟐(𝒙𝒊)� × 𝝓𝒊                                (2. 17) = 𝑷𝟐(𝒙𝒊)�
𝟏−𝑷𝟐(𝒙𝒊)� × 𝝎𝟏𝒊                                                 (2. 18)                
In this form, it becomes evident that the weights are the result of a two-step (matching) 
procedure. In the first step, described by the term 𝑃2(𝑥𝚤)�
1−𝑃2(𝑥𝚤)�  , we reweigh the outcomes of women 
who were not sterilized during the FSP time period by giving higher weights to the outcomes of 
those women who are observationally more similar to women that were sterilized during the FSP 
time period. The second step is essentially the same as the reweighting performed before on the 
𝑆2 = 1 group and thus is described by the term 𝜔1𝑖. In other words, in the second step we give 
more weight to the outcomes of women with a higher counter-factual probability of being treated 
by the FSP (given the counterfactual of being sterilized at all during the FSP time period).  
 By joining the results of Equations (12) and (15), we can estimate the ATT using: 





∑ 𝒚𝒊𝝎𝟎𝒊(𝟏 − 𝒔𝟐𝒊)𝑵𝒊=𝟏
∑ 𝝎𝟎𝒊(𝟏 − 𝒔𝟐𝒊)𝑵𝒊=𝟏                          (2. 19)           
 We have focused so far on the impact of sterilizations that were caused by the FSP, but 
we could also, for comparison purposes, be interested in the impact of sterilizations that occurred 
outside of the policy. Using the same procedures as before, it can be shown that the ATT for 
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sterilizations that occurred during 1996-1997 but would have occurred even in the absence of the 
policy can be estimated using equation ():  
       𝑬�𝒀𝟏 − 𝒀𝟎|𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏,𝑫 = 𝟎� � = ∑ 𝒚𝒊𝝎�𝟏𝒊𝒔𝟐𝒊𝑵𝒊=𝟏∑ 𝝎�𝟏𝒊𝒔𝟐𝒊𝑵𝒊=𝟏 − ∑ 𝒚𝒊𝝎�𝟎𝒊(𝟏 − 𝒔𝟐𝒊)𝑵𝒊=𝟏∑ 𝝎�𝟎𝒊(𝟏 − 𝒔𝟐𝒊)𝑵𝒊=𝟏             (2. 20)         
where 𝜔�1𝑖 = 𝑃1(𝑥𝚤)�𝑃2(𝑥𝚤)� × 𝜙𝑖 and 𝜔�0𝑖 = 𝑃1 (𝑥𝚤)�1−𝑃2(𝑥𝚤)� × 𝜙𝑖 .  
2.3 Data: Peruvian Demographic and Health Surveys  
  We investigate the Peruvian sterilization policy using the fourth, and fifth waves of the 
Demographic and Health Surveys for Peru (hereafter DHSIV, and DHSV.) The Demographic 
and Health Surveys are nationally representative cross sectional surveys. Both DHSIV and 
DHSV were conducted after the policy had ended and thus allow us to look at potential impacts 
on fertility and other household outcomes. DHS IV was conducted in 2000 and has a sample size 
of 27,843 women aged 15-49; and DHS V was collected continuously over the course of 2004 to 
2008 and has a sample size of 41,648 women. The primary advantage of the survey for 
addressing our research questions is the information collected on birth control methods including 
sterilization and the date when the sterilization occurred. The surveys also include detailed birth 
histories and information on place of residence. Our analysis sample includes all women who 
were eligible to be sterilized during the policy period 1996 to 1997-- ever-married women who 
had at least one child and who were not previously sterilized14--giving us a sample size of 14,430 
eligible women in DHSIV, 707 of whom were sterilized during the policy period; and 16,673 
eligible women in DHS V, 735 of whom were sterilized during the policy. 
                                                 
14 There was an existing law prior to the policy requiring spousal consent for sterilization (Coe, 2004) and all 
women who report sterilizations in both DHS were married (or had previously been married) and had at least one 
child at the time of sterilization. 
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 We estimate the impact of the FSP on fertility as well as on household outcomes. To 
measure fertility we use the number of surviving children in a given year. We can also use the 
birth histories to measure number of children ever born and child mortality, which are alternative 
outcomes we plan to pursue. Next we look at the impact of the policy on women's outcomes. The 
DHS has limited information on labor force outcomes, but we make use of a question asking 
whether the respondent is currently working and we use this as a proxy for labor force 
participation. We also estimate the impact on reports of domestic violence in the last 12 months 
as sterilization could impact a woman's bargaining power relative to her spouse.  
 We examine several outcomes of household children to test whether the policy impacted 
well-being as measured through health and education. We want to compare children whose 
mothers were sterilized--and therefore had no more siblings--to counterfactual children whose 
mothers were not sterilized and therefore likely had younger siblings. This kind of comparison 
would allow us to test a quality/quantity trade-off. Therefore, we only look at outcomes for 
children born prior to the policy. Weight for height and height for age was collected for all 
children age four and under, so we are restricted to DHS IV for this outcome since all children 
under four were born after the policy by the time the DHS V survey began in 2004. In both DHS 
IV and DHS V we measure years of schooling and current enrollment (controlling for age) of 
household children under 15. In the DHS V we can also examine the education level of girls over 
15 who are old enough to be survey respondents and but were children at the time of the policy. 
Having fewer younger siblings to help care for could have allowed girls to stay in school.  
 One limitation of the Peruvian DHS is that it does not contain accurate information on 
respondents' ethnic group. One of the claims of human rights activists is that the Fujimori policy 
targeted indigenous women from the Quechua or Aymara groups. DHS IV and V ask 
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respondents their language among which Quechua or Aymara are choices.  But only 15% of 
eligible women DHS V responded that they spoke either of these languages. This variable clearly 
does not accurately measure ethnicity, as the Amerindian population is closer to 40% of the 
Peruvian population.  
2.3.A Descriptive Analysis of Sterilization in Peru 1990-1998 
 Table 2.1 presents summary statistics from DHS IV and DHS V (and from DHS II (1990-
1002) prior to the policy) relating to fertility highlighting the strong negative correlation between 
family size and income (proxied by education) or wealth. We see that going from the highest to 
the lowest levels of mother’s education doubles the number of living children for mothers over 
40 from 2.2 children to more than 5.4 in 2000. This contrast is similarly strong across the wealth 
index. Rural households have substantially more children than urban households. Comparing 
number of children across the two surveys we see that fertility decreased at all education and 
wealth levels from 2000 to the 2004-2008 period.  
 Figure 2.1shows the number of sterilizations reported in DHS IV and DHS V by year, 
and confirms the sharp increase in sterilizations during the policy period. In the analysis that 
follows we will consider 1996 and 1997 to be the aggressive sterilization “policy period.” Using 
age- and gender-specific population estimates for Peru from the United Nations Population 
Division, we can estimate the number of actual sterilizations implied by the self-reported 
sterilizations in the nationally representative DHS surveys. Based on the UN estimated Peruvian 
population of women age 15 to 49 in 2000, the DHS IV is a 0.41 percent sample of the relevant 
population. Based on this sampling scale, the 417 sterilization reported in 1997 (representing 408 
women when weighted) imply that 99,430 women were sterilized in that year, which is 
remarkably similar to the numbers reported by Fujimori’s opponents. If we sum together all of 
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the DHS IV reported sterilizations that occurred during the supposed policy period from 1996 to 
1998, we estimate that roughly 218,626 women were sterilized. This implies that approximately 
3.4 percent of women age 15 to 49 were sterilized, or 4.5 percent of women age 20 to 45 who 
were in their prime fertility years. If certain regional or demographic characteristics were 
specifically targeted the percentage of the relevant population that was sterilized could be much 
higher. There are some notable differences between the DHS IV and DHS V surveys in the 
reporting on female sterilization that occurred during the 1990s. Looking at Figure 1 we see that 
the increase in sterilizations from the pre-policy period to the policy period was more gradual in 
DHS V and less abrupt than in DHS IV, and similarly more gradual for the decrease in 
sterilizations after the policy ended. Part of the difference could be recall bias given that the DHS 
V survey took place eight to 12 years after the policy, while DHS IV was conducted only three 
years from the peak of the policy. DHS V collected a smaller nationally representative sample in 
each of the five years of the survey, which ranged from a 0.07 percent sample of the age-/gender-
specific population in 2004, to a 0.2 percent sample in 2008. The implied number of 
sterilizations in 1997 based on DHS V reports is 79,752 and the total number of sterilizations 
over from 1996 to 1998 is 179,352, or 2.8 percent of women aged 15 to 49. It is possible that 
some of the sterilizations that actually occurred during the policy were mistakenly reported to 
occur in the year before or after the policy ended in DHS V. If this were the case, we would 
expect to find muted treatment effects using DHS V data. These discrepancies deserve further 
investigation.  
2.3.B Estimating the probability of treatment by the Fujimori sterilization policy using DHS IV 
and DHS V 
 We estimate the probability of sterilization in the pre-policy and policy periods using a 
pseudo panel constructed from the cross-sectional data in the DHS surveys. These probabilities, 
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conditional on observable characteristics, are the propensity scores 𝑃1(𝑥) and 𝑃2(𝑥) described in 
the methodology section. We use the date of sterilization and other variables to construct a 
longitudinal history for each woman describing her fertility and marital time path from the 
beginning of what we consider the pre-policy period, 1990 to the end of the policy period in 
1998. Each woman has one observation for each year and dummy indicating whether she is 
sterilized in each year. Once she is sterilized she has no further observations. Using this type of 
quasi panel allows us to estimate the conditional probability of being sterilized in each year—the 
annual hazard of being sterilized given that one has not been sterilized up that point.15  This 
approach takes account of the fact that a woman sterilized in 1997 was at risk of being sterilized 
in all previous periods and as such should be included in calculating the probability of being 
sterilized in 1994, for example. Furthermore, because of detailed birth and (somewhat) detailed 
marital histories provided in the DHS surveys we can use richer information about spacing of 
children in the quasi panel than in a cross sectional estimation of probability of sterilization by 
year. We also include 56 regional categories starting with Peru's 25 departments and further 
differentiating by geography (jungle, mountain, coastal) and by urban and rural status. Other 
covariates are age, number and age of children, number of boys, infant mortality, age at first 
birth, and education. Finally, using the pseudo panel we are able to include a time trend in the 
logit to account for secular changes in fertility and sterilization that could be occurring within 
each period. We estimate the probability of sterilization in each period using a logit.  
 When we calculate ∆𝑃�(𝑥) = 𝑃2�(𝑥) − 𝑃1� (𝑥) as in Equation (2.4) in some cases the value 
is negative leading 𝑃�(𝑥) (𝐷 = 1|𝑆2 = 1,𝑋 = 𝑥  (Equation(2.5)) to be less than zero. Since this 
                                                 
15This is based on a extension of proportional hazard models to discrete time proposed by Cox (1972).  Estimating a 
logit regression on a set of pseudo observations generated from a cross-section amounts to fitting a discrete-time 




object is a probability, negative values are not defined and we set these values to zero. The 
rationale is that such women, if sterilized, had a zero probability of being treated by the policy. 
The number of observations for which we make this adjustment is noted in the results tables.  
2.4 Estimating the Impact of the Fujimori Sterilization Policy  
2.4.A Characteristics of women targeted by the FSP 
 Table 2.2, based on DHS IV, and  
Table 2.3, based on DHS V, show the characteristics of the sample of eligible women before and 
after reweighting. The first three columns of Table 2.2 and 2.3 give the characteristics of the 
non-reweighted sample of women eligible to be sterilized during the policy—ever married 
women with at least one child who were not previously sterilized--separated by whether they 
were sterilized during the policy period. The findings based on DHS IV and DHS V are similar, 
so we will summarize them jointly. Column 2 gives the characteristics of what we have called 
the contaminated treatment group which includes both women treated by the FSP and women 
who were not treated by the policy and would have been sterilized even the absence of the 
program. We see that sterilized women are older, have more children, slightly less education 
than the average eligible woman, but that a roughly similar proportion of women sterilized 
during the policy live in rural areas.  
 In columns 4 and 5, we apply the weights described in the methodology section to create 
the effective treatment and control groups we use to estimate the impacts of the policy. The 
group of women who were sterilized during 1996-1997 are reweighted to represent only the 
group of women who were treated by the policy (i.e. we use weight𝜔0). The non-sterilized 
women are reweighted to match the observable characteristics of the treated women (i.e. we use 
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weight 𝜔1). The differences compared to column 2 are striking. The women we estimate to be in 
the treatment group are younger, considerably less educated, and much more likely to live in 
rural areas than the contaminated treatment group suggested. The last two columns of Table 2.2 
and 2.3, specifically highlight the differences between women who were sterilized by the policy 
and sterilized women who we estimate would have been sterilized even in the absence of the 
policy. Women sterilized outside of the policy are considerably more educated and more likely 
to live in urban areas, though they do not have substantially fewer children. If we suspect there 
may be heterogeneous treatment effects of sterilization by these characteristics, then these 
columns confirm the benefit of our method in separating these two types of sterilized women. 
Column 6 gives the demographic characteristics of the women we estimate were affected by the 
Fujimori Sterilization Policy and thus provide an answer to our first research question: who was 
targeted by the Fujimori Sterilization Policy? We estimate that women targeted by the policy 
were on average 31 years old, had four children at the time of sterilization, and 5.6 years of 
schooling. Their average age at first birth was 19. Roughly half of these women lived in rural 
areas and a quarter were from rural mountain regions, but we also find that a significant 
proportion of treated women came from urban coastal areas like Lima. 
2.4.B Impact of the FSP on fertility 
 Table 2.4 shows the estimated impact of the FSP on fertility. The following pattern will 
be used in all of the subsequent results tables (unless otherwise noted): The first three columns 
give results based on DHS IV which was collected three years after the policy. The next section 
of three columns are based on DHS V which was collected seven to eleven years after the policy. 
The first column in each section gives the results of the standard reweighing estimation that only 
reweights observations of women not sterilized during the FSP. In other words these standard 
 71 
 
reweighting estimates do not account for the contamination of the treatment group and conflate 
the impact of sterilization on women treated by FSP and those who would have been sterilized 
even in the absence of the FSP. The second column gives our preferred specification-- the 
estimated ATT for women sterilized by the FSP based on the reweighting technique described in 
the methodology section (in notation these women have 𝑆2 = 1,𝐷 = 1).  Finally the third 
column is the estimated impact of sterilization on outcomes for women who were sterilized 
during the policy period but were not treated by the FSP (in notation these women have 𝑆2 =1,𝐷 = 0). 
 In column 2, based on DHS IV, we estimate that by 2000, women treated by the FSP had 
0.33 fewer children than the non-sterilized control group , and in column 5, based on DHSV, we 
estimate that by 2004, treated women had 0.85 fewer children. These estimates of the impact on 
fertility are larger than the standard reweighting estimates in columns 1 and 4, suggesting that the 
policy had a stronger impact on fertility among treated women than among women who would 
have been sterilized anyway. This is shown by the estimates in columns 3 and 6 which give the 
estimated impact of sterilization on women sterilized outside of the FSP. We find that women 
sterilized outside of the FSP had 0.22 fewer children by 2000, and 0.58 fewer children by 2004 
than relevant counterfactual women.  All of the coefficients in Table 2.4 are negative, but could 
also be expressed positively as the number of additional children born to women in the control 
group(s). We think these results are large but plausible given the age and existing fertility of the 
treated women, the amount of time since the policy, and limited access to contraception available 
in Peru.  
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2.4.C Impact of the FSP on household outcomes 
 The remaining tables provide estimates of the impact of the FSP on women's, and 
children's outcomes. Since in the previous section we estimate that the policy led to a substantial 
decrease in fertility, we can hypothesize that any impacts on other outcomes were the result of 
lowered fertility. However, at this point we cannot rule out impacts of the nature of the policy 
itself, for example the trauma of a coercive act, on outcomes. In this summary of results, we will 
focus on the estimated impact of the FSP in columns 2 and 5 of the table.  Table 2.5 provides 
estimates of the impact of the policy on women's labor force participation.  Column 2 shows an 
increase in probability of working of five percent in 2000 based on reweighting which is 
significant at a 10 percent level. However, there is no significant impact on working by DHS V 
in 2004-2008 as seen in column 6.  Table 2.6 shows estimates for the binary outcome of 
experiencing domestic violence (either physical or sexual) in the last 12 months (this information 
is only available in DHS V). We estimate that being sterilized by the FSP increased the 
likelihood of experiencing domestic violence by 5 percentage points.   
Table 2.3 shows that 13 percent of eligible women report domestic violence in the last 12 
months. We need to further explore the mechanisms of this estimated impact, but changes in 
ability to bear children may impact women's bargaining power within the household. We view 
our estimated impact on domestic violence with caution, however, as it could be the case that 
women susceptible to domestic violence could also be those more susceptible to a coercive 
government policy. 
 Turning to the impact of the FSP on the children of sterilized women, in summary we 
find small and mostly non- or marginally significant impacts when we combine girls and boys. 
Table 2.7 gives the estimated impact on biometric measures of weight for height and height for 
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age (in standard deviations from the reference median) based on DHS IV among children under 
four who were born prior to the policy. This table only shows results for DHS IV since children 
born prior to the policy in DHS V are over four years old, and the surveys only record biometric 
information for children under four. Point estimates on weight for height in column 5 are small 
and none are statistically significant. Impacts on height for age in column 2, which is a longer 
term measure of health, are somewhat larger, but again, for the most part, not significant. When 
we examine girls separately in Table 2.8, however, we find that daughters of women treated by 
the FSP had height for age that was 0.29 standard deviations greater than counterfactual girls. 
This estimate is significant at a one percent level. Looking at column 3, we see that there is a 
similar, though not significant positive impact on daughters of women sterilized outside of the 
FSP.  
 In Table 2.9 and Table 2.10, we find a small but significant positive impact on years of 
schooling and enrollment for children under age 15 in DHS IV three years after the policy.. 
While the magnitude of the impact is similar for DHS V, seven to 11 years after the policy, the 
estimates are not statistically significant. When we look just at girls' enrollment in Table 2.11, 
we find that there is a 2.3 percentage point increase in school enrollment for girls of women 
sterilized by the FSP about double the impact found when we combined boys and girls. These 
small impacts are likely due to the high levels of enrollment of primary school children in Peru, 
even in rural areas, leaving little margin to increase schooling for these ages. However, we find 
no impact on education of older girls in Table 2.12 based on DHS V. These are girls who are 
aged 15 to 22 and are respondents to DHS V as adults, but were children at the time of the 
policy. The fact that their mothers were sterilized could mean they had fewer young siblings to 
help care for than counterfactual girls and were able to stay in school longer. We do not find 
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evidence of this kind of impact. However, if this impact accrued to girls who then moved out of 
the house younger, we will not be able to measure the effect.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 There is a continuing debate about the causal link between access to family planning and 
reductions in fertility in both the developed and developing world. Beyond any direct impact on 
the level of fertility, access to contraception clearly allows women to control the timing of 
fertility, which reduces constraints on choices about work and caring for existing children. 
Recent research in both the United States (Bailey, 2006) and Columbia (Miller, 2010) uses 
plausibly exogenous variation in access to show that contraception significantly increases female 
educational attainment and labor force participation by allowing women to delay first births. Our 
preliminary findings in Peru seem to confirm that the mere reduction of fertility that is not 
necessarily associated with substantial improvements in welfare in the context of potentially 
coerced sterilizations. We are finding that when birth control is imposed, the benefits of making 
choices about fertility may not accrue to women and their households. While we do find small 
improvements in height for age and school enrollment for girls whose mothers were sterilized by 
the Fujimori sterilization policy, in general the substantial decrease in fertility caused by the 




 Figure 2.1. Number of Reported Sterilizations by Year                                                     
































































































































Table 2.1. Number of Living Children for Mothers over 40                                                           











Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
By Mother's Education
   no education 5.64 2.60 5.43 2.48
   primary 4.42 2.34 4.80 2.39
   secondary 3.24 1.79 3.22 1.80
   higher 2.61 1.60 2.16 1.35
  Total 4.39 2.55 3.91 2.37
By Qntls of HH Wealth Index
   lowest q 6.08 2.75 5.73 2.56
   second q 5.43 2.54 5.05 2.33
   middle q 4.80 2.38 4.06 2.25
   fourth q 3.87 2.22 3.28 1.89
   highest q 2.94 1.72 2.59 1.62
  Total 4.39 2.55 3.84 2.35
Note: Using Sampling Weight Provided by DHS




Table 2.2. DHS IV : Characteristics of Eligible Women - Reweighted Estimates of Characteristics of  Treated Women 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S2 = 1 S2 =0 S2 = 1 S2 = 0 D = 1 D = 0
Pre-Policy Characteristics
Age in 1996 32.36 31.44 31.24 31.05 0.53 31.24 32.62
# Kids in 1996 3.91 2.81 4.08 3.91 0.08 4.08 3.81
Years of education 7.12 7.89 5.65 5.88 0.33 5.65 7.95
Age at first birth 20.08 20.72 19.18 19.28 0.60 19.18 20.52
rural 0.35 0.36 0.49 0.48 0.84 0.49 0.25
coast 0.58 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.77 0.48 0.72
mountain 0.26 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.85 0.33 0.16
jungle 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.85 0.18 0.13
urban coast 0.48 0.45 0.37 0.38 0.87 0.37 0.62
rural coast 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.46 0.11 0.10
urban mountain 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.85 0.08 0.05
rural mountain 0.17 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.76 0.25 0.10
urban jungle 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.77 0.06 0.08
rural jungle 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.97 0.12 0.05
Outcomes and other variables
Wanted last Prenancy1 0.30 0.47 0.28 0.35 0.04 0.28 0.30
Wanted last Prenancy Later 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.71 0.16 0.14
Did not Want last Prenancy 0.55 0.31 0.57 0.51 0.12 0.57 0.56
Notes: All observations are weighted with DHS sampling weights.  Reweighting refers to the propensity-score reweighting technique
 described in the methodology section.  1. Among pregnancies that occurred prior to 1997
p-value for 
zero diff
Among Women Sterilized     
1996-1997  S2 = 1
Reweighted to    
represent D=1                  
Reweighted




Notes: Columns 1 and 2 are the non-reweighted sample of women eligible to be sterilized during the policy window.  𝑆2 = 1were sterilized (contaminated 
treatment group) and 𝑆2 = 0 were not.  In Columns 4 and 5, we apply the weights described in the methodology section to create our preferred treatment 
and control groups.  Women who were sterilized during 1996-1997 are reweighted to represent only the women who were treated by the policy using 
weight 𝜔0. Non-sterilized women are reweighted using weight 𝜔1.Columns 5 and 6 reweight sterilized women to compare those treated by the policy to 





Table 2.3.  DHS V : Characteristics of Eligible Women - Reweighted Estimates of Characteristics of  Treated Women 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
all S2 = 1 S2 =0 S2 = 1 S2 = 0 D = 1 D = 0
Pre-Policy Characteristics
Age in 1996 29.09 31.11 29.00 29.75 29.68 29.75 30.89
# Kids in 1996 2.51 3.71 2.45 3.70 3.73 3.70 3.86
Years of education 7.96 6.88 8.01 5.23 5.41 5.23 6.81
Age at first birth 20.53 20.31 20.53 19.97 19.82 19.97 20.11
rural 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.56 0.53 0.56 0.36
coast 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.55
mountain 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.30
jungle 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15
urban coast 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.42
rural coast 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13
urban mountain 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.12
rural mountain 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.18
urban jungle 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
rural jungle 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.05
Outcomes and other variables
Domestic Violence in last 12 
months 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.13
Labor Force Participation 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.69
Wealth Index 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.39
Notes: All observations are weighted with DHS sampling weights.  Reweighting refers to the propensity-score reweighting technique
 described in the methodology section. 
Among All Eligible Women Among  Sterilized women
Not Reweighted
Reweighted to     
represent D=1                  
Reweighted
 















Sterilized          








Sterilized          





S2=1 -0.275*** -0.327*** -0.218*** -0.693*** -0.846*** -0.582***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023)
Age -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.028***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Years of Schooling 0.003 0.005 0.000 -0.031*** -0.026** -0.030***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
# of children in 1997 1.007*** 1.004*** 1.009*** 1.020*** 1.010*** 1.023***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Age at first birth 0.003 0.001 0.004** 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Geographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.543*** 0.601*** 0.482*** 1.534*** 1.531*** 1.490***
(0.084) (0.128) (0.080) (0.188) (0.274) (0.178)
R-squared 0.958 0.948 0.969 0.893 0.892 0.905
Observations 14430 14430 14430 16673 16673 16673
Observations with 
positive ΔP(x) 
NA 10607 10607 NA 14509 14509
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DHS IV (2000) DHS V (2004-2008) - # of Kids in 2004
Modified Reweighting Modified Reweighting
 
 
Notes: The first three colum s give results based on DHS IV the next three columns are based on DHS V. The first column in each section gives the 
results of the standard reweighing estimator that only weights the non-sterilized women. The second column gives our preferred specification based on 
the reweighting technique described in the methodology section.  The third column is the estimated impact of sterilization on outcomes for women who 















Sterilized          








Sterilized          





S2=1 0.022 0.049* -0.009 -0.007 0.013 -0.023
(0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.033)
Age 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.000 0.004 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Years of Schooling 0.016 0.002 0.031** 0.007 -0.001 0.007
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
# of children in 1997 -0.022** -0.034*** -0.008 0.005 -0.006 0.009
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Age at first birth -0.012*** -0.011** -0.014*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Geographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.658*** 0.370** 0.760*** 1.005*** 0.913*** 1.037***
(0.172) (0.187) (0.169) (0.115) (0.127) (0.149)
R-squared 0.120 0.146 0.113 0.075 0.112 0.072
Observations 14430 14430 14430 16673 16673 16673
Observations with 
positive ΔP(x) 
NA 10607 10607 NA 14509 14509
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Modified Reweighting Modified Reweighting
DHS IV (2000) DHS V (2004-2008)













Sterilized          





S2=1 0.014 0.050* -0.010
(0.021) (0.027) (0.023)
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Years of Schooling -0.002 -0.006 -0.001
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
# of children in 1997 0.013 0.020 0.009
(0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
Age at first birth -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Geographic controls yes yes yes
Constant 0.120* 0.094 0.167**
(0.072) (0.092) (0.082)
R-squared 0.054 0.090 0.056
Observations 13381 13381 13381
Observations with positive 
ΔP(x) 
NA 11825 11825





Notes: The first column gives the results of the standard reweighing estimator that only weights the non-sterilized women. The 
second column gives our preferred specification based on the reweighting technique described in the methodology section.  The 
third column is the estimated impact of sterilization on outcomes for women who were sterilized during the policy period but were 















Sterilized          








Sterilized          





S2=1 0.136 0.118 0.141 -0.067 -0.048 -0.080
(0.099) (0.110) (0.108) (0.080) (0.091) (0.092)
Age 0.043*** 0.037** 0.045*** -0.010 -0.011 -0.009
(0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Years of Schooling 0.062 0.052 0.057 -0.025 -0.045 -0.017
(0.040) (0.049) (0.042) (0.031) (0.041) (0.030)
# of children in 1997 -0.154*** -0.145** -0.164*** 0.038 0.052 0.023
(0.050) (0.061) (0.050) (0.047) (0.058) (0.041)
Age at first birth -0.027 -0.013 -0.030* 0.004 -0.012 0.009
(0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013)
Geographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for child's age yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -1.006* -0.927 -0.547 1.165** 0.523 0.995**
(0.568) (0.599) (0.522) (0.484) (0.335) (0.427)
R-squared 0.318 0.315 0.316 0.143 0.146 0.164
Observations 2899 2899 2898 2899 2899 2898
Observations with positive 
ΔP(x) 
NA 2160 2160 NA 2160 2160
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Modified Reweighting Modified Reweighting
Height for Age (in sd from  reference median) Weight for Height  (in sd from reference median)
 
 Notes: See notes to Table 2.6.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***p<0.01. **p<.05, *p<0.1 
 
Notes: The first column in each section gives the results of the standard reweighing estimator that only weights the non-sterilized women. The second 
column gives our preferred specification based on the reweighting technique described in the methodology section.  The third column is the estimated 
impact of sterilization on outcomes for women who w re ster lized during the policy period but were not treated by the FSP.  Robust standard errors 















Sterilized          
by FSP                                                               
D=1
Sterilized 





Sterilized          





S2=1 0.276** 0.285** 0.228 -0.026 -0.047 -0.029
(0.129) (0.131) (0.144) (0.106) (0.119) (0.124)
Age 0.040** 0.045** 0.036 0.006 0.021 -0.001
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015)
Years of Schooling 0.052 0.002 0.074 -0.038 -0.035 -0.035
(0.052) (0.058) (0.062) (0.043) (0.051) (0.046)
# of children in 1997 -0.174*** -0.162*** -0.195*** -0.001 -0.034 0.003
(0.056) (0.058) (0.070) (0.061) (0.076) (0.054)
Age at first birth -0.032 -0.026 -0.034 0.007 -0.021 0.014
(0.022) (0.026) (0.027) (0.019) (0.028) (0.017)
Geographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for child's age yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.613 -1.167** -0.048 -0.058 0.077 0.241
(0.421) (0.554) (0.550) (0.382) (0.421) (0.477)
R-squared 0.352 0.376 0.345 0.212 0.267 0.219
Observations 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457
Observations with positive 
ΔP(x) 
NA 1084 1084 NA 1084 1084
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Height for Age (in sd from  reference median) Weight for Height  (in sd from reference median)
Modified Reweighting Modified Reweighting















Sterilized          








Sterilized          
by FSP                                                               
D=1
Sterilized 
outside FSP   
D=0 
S2=1 0.084** 0.093** 0.077 0.032 0.108 -0.034
(0.039) (0.041) (0.050) (0.085) (0.094) (0.103)
Age 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 0.026** 0.043** 0.016
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015)
Years of Schooling 0.046*** 0.060*** 0.024 0.122*** 0.138*** 0.110***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.036) (0.048) (0.040)
# of children in 1997 -0.128*** -0.116*** -0.143*** -0.179*** -0.204*** -0.161***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.038) (0.052) (0.042)
Age at first birth -0.019*** -0.014 -0.023*** -0.009 -0.037* 0.013
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017)
Geographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for child's age yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.169 -0.383 -0.291 0.230 1.930*** 0.294
(0.383) (0.265) (0.216) (0.820) (0.508) (0.569)
R-squared 0.807 0.792 0.826 0.366 0.329 0.431
Observations 22520 22513 22513 14021 14016 14016
Observations with positive 
ΔP(x) NA 18886 18886 NA 12329 12329
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Modified Reweighting Modified Reweighting
DHS IV (2000) DHS V (2004-2008)















Sterilized          








Sterilized          





S2=1 0.005 0.016** -0.009 0.001 0.009 -0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.002** 0.002 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.007** 0.008** 0.007 0.007*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
# of children in 1997 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.009*** -0.006 -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Age at first birth 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Geographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for child's age yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.032 -0.099 -0.037 0.964*** 0.958*** 0.962***
(0.071) (0.103) (0.058) (0.051) (0.036) (0.052)
R-squared 0.649 0.632 0.681 0.126 0.128 0.150
Observations 22554 22554 22547 14021 14021 14016
Observations with positive 
ΔP(x) NA 18917 18917 NA 12329 12329
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DHS IV (2000) DHS V (2004-2008)
Modified Reweighting Modified Reweighting















Sterilized          








Sterilized          





S2=1 0.009 0.023* -0.011 0.005 0.016 -0.007
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Age 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.004*** 0.003 0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.012** 0.005 0.010* 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
# of children in 1997 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.010** -0.008 -0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Age at first birth 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Geographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for child's age yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.023 -0.015 -0.041 0.980*** 0.900*** 0.992***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.056) (0.067)
R-squared 0.649 0.632 0.681 0.126 0.128 0.150
Observations 11008 11008 11005 6905 6905 6903
Observations with positive 
ΔP(x) NA 9176 9176 NA 6153 6153
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Modified Reweighting Modified Reweighting
DHS IV (2000) DHS V (2004-2008)













Sterilized          





S2=1 -0.140 -0.061 -0.155
(0.129) (0.186) (0.131)
Age 0.001 -0.043 0.007
(0.021) (0.031) (0.022)
Years of Schooling 0.119** 0.284*** 0.047
(0.054) (0.078) (0.055)
# of children in 1997 -0.268*** -0.160** -0.290***
(0.058) (0.067) (0.068)
Age at first birth 0.019 0.065** 0.011
(0.023) (0.033) (0.026)
Geographic controls yes yes yes
Constant 10.320*** 13.246*** 12.350***
(1.452) (1.634) (0.947)
R-squared 0.476 0.425 0.526




Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DHS V (2004-2008)
Modified Reweighting
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Chapter 3  
 









In the early 2000s, the NGO loveLife, in partnership with the South African Department of 
Health, rolled out the National Adolescent Friendly Clinic Initiative (NAFCI) with the goal of 
preventing HIV and unwanted pregnancy through education and increased clinical access to 
reproductive health services. By 2010, 500 clinics were accredited as "youth friendly." Based on 
interviews with stakeholders and a series of controls, I argue that the roll-out led to a 
conditionally random increase in reproductive health knowledge and clinical access for 
adolescents. I use GPS data and historical residence information from secure National Income 
Dynamics Study data to geolink respondents’ location during their early teen years to the 
accreditation date and location of NAFCI clinics. Preliminary results show that women who 
lived within 5 km of a NAFCI clinic when they were 12-17 years old are substantially and 








I am grateful to Cally Ardington, Martha Bailey, Nicola Branson, Diane Cooper, Robert Garlick, 
David Lam, Murray Leibbrandt, Jeff Smith and Pam Smock for helpful comments and guidance.  
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3.1 Introduction  
 There is an unresolved debate about whether family planning policies affect fertility.  
Bongaarts (1994) argues that the increased supply of contraception provided by family planning 
interventions drive down fertility.  Pritchett (1994) counters that while increased contraceptive 
use is coincident with falling fertility, reduced demand for children drives fertility decline, and 
the causal impact of family planning interventions is small.  As in any market where we only 
observe the amount consumed, disentangling the role of supply and demand drivers is a 
challenge.   In the realm of fertility determining causal pathways is especially challenging given 
the inherent endogeneity of fertility decisions and the dearth of good instruments or feasible 
randomizations.   In the case of adolescent fertility there are often frictions on both the demand 
and supply sides.  Lack of sex education can break the link between desire to prevent pregnancy 
and contraceptive use.  Social stigma can be a barrier between contraceptive supply and teen 
access. 
 In early post-apartheid South Africa, the supply of family planning was technically 
unconstrained.  The Apartheid regime’s goal of controlling the non-white population resulted in 
widespread, free availability of contraception, and the new democratic government elected in 
1994 ushered in some of the most progressive reproductive health laws in the world (Cooper et 
al., 2004).  The 1998 South African Demographic and Health Survey reported that  80 to 90 
percent of 20 to 30 year olds had ever used a modern contraceptive (DHS 1998).  However, 
among the 30 percent of all South African women under 20 who already had at least one child, 
79% reported they did “not want” their last pregnancy.1  This clear evidence of an unsatisfied 
desire among teens to delay pregnancy would be defined by family planning advocates as unmet 
                                                 
1 Mothers under the age of 20 regarding their last pregnancy in the last 3 years: 20% wanted pregnancy then, 66% 
wanted later,13% did not want the pregnancy.  
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need—a supply problem.  South African public health researchers and advocates believed that 
high rates of unintended teen pregnancy which coincided with soaring rates of HIV among 
young women pointed to a knowledge gap and social and institutional barriers to adolescent 
access to reproductive health services.  Thus, evidence on both the supply and demand side 
pointed to a more optimal outcome, but informational and social frictions drove a wedge 
between unmet demand to control fertility and untapped supply of family planning.  The 
National Adolescent Friendly Clinic Initiative (NAFCI) aimed to tackle this wedge. 
 NAFCI was an intensive clinic accreditation, education and community outreach 
intervention that rolled out to health clinics across South Africa starting in the early 2000s.  
Based on interviews with stakeholders, a series of controls, and evidence of a trend breaks in 
service provision, I argue that the timing and geographic variation of the rollout led to an 
exogenous increase in adolescent access to reproductive health knowledge and services.  My 
analysis is based on geo-linking data from several sources to construct a measure of access to 
NAFCI clinics for South African adolescents and comparing fertility outcomes for women who 
lived near accredited clinics in adolescence compared to those who did not.  I find that women 
who lived within 5 km of a NAFCI clinic when they were 12 to 17 years old are substantially 
and statistically significantly less likely to experience a birth before the age of 18. 
 This paper contributes to the public health literature on the effectiveness of programs to 
increase adolescent access to and usage of reproductive health services, particularly in Africa.2 
There is a growing emphasis in public health on youth friendly services, but to date the evidence 
                                                 
2  Dick et al. (2006) survey the literature in a World Health Organization report.  
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on efficacy has been sparse.3  The paper also ties into the extensive economics literature on the 
causes and consequences of adolescent childbearing in the US (ex. Geronimus and Korenman, 
1992, Lang and Weinstein, 2013) and the expanding literature in developing economies (Herrera 
and Sahn 2013, Marteleto et al., 2008, Ranchhod et al., 2011).   
 Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on the impact of family planning on 
fertility outcomes by providing new causal estimates of a youth-targeted intervention on fertility 
timing.  Recent studies in both the US and developing economies use innovative identification 
strategies to bolster Pritchett’s claim that increasing access to family planning has negligible 
impacts on completed fertility (Bailey, 2006, Miller, 2010).  But these papers point to other 
important and more nuanced impacts of access to contraception such as enabling women to 
optimally time fertility to maximize human capital investments.  My results indicate that an 
intervention specifically directed at increasing adolescent access to reproductive health 
knowledge and services has the potential to substantially alter fertility timing among teens 
3.2 Background and Description of the National Adolescent Friendly Clinic Initiative 
3.2.A Fertility Timing and Contraceptive Access in Early Post-Apartheid South Africa 
 The 1998 South African Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) provides context for the 
early post-Apartheid contraceptive and fertility patterns that motivated the National Adolescent 
Friendly Clinic Initiative.4  Thirty-five percent of 19 year-olds (and 25 percent of 18 year olds) 
reported ever being pregnant (DHS 1998: Final Report 2002).5  While this rate of adolescent 
                                                 
3 A new randomized control trial in Ghana was presented at PAA: Aninanya et al. (2014) 
http://paa2014.princeton.edu/uploads/141674 
4 Apartheid was a system of strictly enforced racial segregation in South Africa.  Apartheid officially ended with 
multi-racial democratic elections in 1994.  While laws no longer classify citizens by the color of their skin, the 
classifications of White, Coloured, Black African, and Indian are still used in everyday conversation and are 
designations in surveys including the South African Census. 
5 Among 19 year-olds 30.2 report being a mother, and among 18 year olds, 19.8 report being a mother.   
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childbearing is low compared to other sub-Saharan countries6, teen childbearing in South Africa 
is more likely to be non-marital, rather than the result of early marriage (Macleod and Tracey, 
2010, United Nations Population Fund, 2003).   Only 1.2 percent of South African 15-19 year 
olds were married in 1998.  There was also evidence of “widespread” and “endemic” gender 
violence and coercive sex experienced by teenage girls in South Africa (Wood et al., 1998).7   
And rates of unintended pregnancy among South African teens were high--78 percent of women 
under the age of 20 reported that their last birth was not wanted or wanted later (DHS 1998).   
 The Apartheid regime’s plan to control the non-white population led to relatively high 
contraceptive prevalence in South Africa compared to other sub-Saharan countries (Cooper, et 
al., 2004).  Contraceptives were widely available at no cost at public clinics, hospitals and 
through mobile service provision.8  However, the high rate of unintended pregnancy among 
teens suggests that South African adolescents had a substantial unmet “need” for family planning 
among adolescents.   
  Based on birth histories from the 2012 wave of the National Income Dynamics Study 
(NIDS)9, Figure 3.1 shows patterns of age-at-first-birth by cohort, and Figure 3.2 shows 
children-ever-born by age-at-first-birth across cohorts. Figure 3.1 shows that after a decrease in 
the early-teen birth rate from the 1960 to 1970 birth cohorts, the proportion of 18 and 19 year 
olds who had given birth remains nearly constant for the 1970, 1980 and 1990 cohorts.  At the 
same time, Figure 3.2 shows that among women born between 1980 and 1990, who were 
                                                 
6 Adolescent birth rate per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19, 2005-2010 was 54 in South Africa while the average for 
Sub-Saharan African was 117.  The rate in Uganda was 159 and Zambia 151.(UN Population Fund, 2003). 
7 A qualitative study in an African township in peri-urban Cape Town in the mid-1990s found that over 60% of 
female respondents aged 14-18 reported having sex against their will, and 59% reported have been beaten by their 
male partners (Wood, et al., 1998).  Note, however, that rates of physical abuse by teenage girls in DHS 1998 are 
significantly lower.  According to Human Rights Watch, in 1995 South Africa had the highest recorded per capita 
rate of rape of for a country not at war. 
8 Long-acting injectables were, and remain, the most common contraceptive method used (DHS 1998, DHIS 2013). 
9 More details about NIDS are provided in Section 3.3A.  
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adolescents in this early post-apartheid era, a teen birth was much more likely to be followed by 
a substantial space before the next birth than for earlier cohorts.  This implies that completed 
fertility is converging for women having early versus late first births in the post-apartheid period.  
The pattern of falling overall fertility in South Africa combined with little change in age at first 
birth is consistent with teen mothers only starting to use contraception after a first birth.     
 Why were sexually active teens who did not want to get pregnant not using 
contraceptives when they were widely available for free?  Qualitative studies in various South 
African regions aimed to address this question (Abdool Karim et al., 1992, Ehlers, 2003, Jewkes 
et al., 2001, Mfono, 1998, Wood and Jewkes, 2006).  The findings pointed to social barriers to 
adolescent access to family planning.  First, teens seemed to lack accurate sexual and 
contraceptive knowledge. For example there were widespread fears stoked by religious leaders 
and even nurses that hormone-based contraceptive use by adolescents could cause permanent 
infertility.10  Next, stigmatization of adolescent sex by health care providers often made clinics 
inhospitable.  Teens reported scolding and even abusive behavior by staff and nurses at public 
clinics and hospitals when they sought contraceptives, and in some cases even refusal to provide 
contraceptives.   
 Concerns among health advocates and the Department of Health about these barriers to 
adolescent access to reproductive health services were also driven by the increasing prevalence 
of HIV among youth, particularly teenage girls.  Department of Health surveys found that in 
1998 and 1999, approximately 20% of pregnant 15-19 year olds were HIV positive (substantially 
                                                 
10 (Jewkes, et al., 2001) report that teen “mothers often indicate that teenage pregnancy is infinitely preferable to the 
possibility of infertility caused by contraceptive use … This is widely perceived by women and family planning 
nurses to be a side-eﬀect of progesterone based injectable contraceptives, particularly Depo-Provera.”  This notion 
was also espoused by “preachers at local African churches”. 
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higher in some regions such as KwaZulu Natal) (Allen et al., 2000, Jewkes, et al., 2001).  HIV 
prevalence among 15-24 year olds was estimated to be three times higher among young women 
than young men--15.% versus 4.8% (Pettifor et al., 2005). 
3.2.B The National Adolescent Friendly Clinic Initiative 
 High rates of unintended teen pregnancy and escalating rates of HIV among young 
people were the driving force behind the establishment of the NGO loveLife in 1999.  The 
National Adolescent Friendly Clinic Initiative (NAFCI) was a key element of loveLife’s strategy 
that also included high profile media campaigns and sporting events promoting “more open and 
better informed communication about sex, HIV, sexuality and gender relations.”  loveLife 
launched NAFCI in consortium with several other non-governmental organizations and 
partnership with the South African Department of Health.11  
 NAFCI had a clinical component aimed at reducing physical and social barriers to 
accessing reproductive health services, and an education component focused on sex education 
and life skills.  The clinical component was based on an “accreditation model” whereby clinics 
worked towards service standards through a quality improvement process and were rewarded 
tiered levels of accreditation based on external assessments. The intensive accreditation process, 
which typically lasted a year, involved training nurses as well as non-medical staff, equipping 
facilities to offer the services and pharmaceuticals youth need, youth-targeted educational 
materials, and publicizing the clinics’ youth friendliness through signage and community 
outreach.  NAFCI’s education component involved building dedicated spaces at clinics for youth 
                                                 
11 Other organizations involved in the consortium were Planned Parenthood, the Reproductive Health Research Unit 
(RHRU) at the University of Witwatersrand and the Health System Trust. 
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education and socialization called “chill rooms” and employing local youth to facilitate sex-
education programs.12  Figure 3.5 gives and example of “youth friendly” signage.    
 The NAFCI was piloted at 10 clinics in 2000.  A major scale-up occurred in 2004 and 
2005 resulting in 350 active NAFCI sites by the end of 2005.  By 2010, almost 500 clinics across 
the country were accredited as “youth friendly,” or approximately ten percent of all public 
clinics.  Figure 3.3 shows the rollout of accredited clinics by activation year and province.  Each 
NAFCI clinic is assigned at least one full-time loveLife peer educator (groundBREAKER, aged 
18 to 25).   In 2013, 1200 groundBREAKERS were employed nationwide, assisted by 6000 to 
8000 part-time youth volunteers.13  
 There is limited evidence on the effectiveness of interventions aimed at increasing 
adolescent utilization of health services in developing countries.14  In 2006, the World Health 
Organization  reviewed evidence from 16 published and unpublished studies and concluded that 
“the evidence is weak and the findings not conclusive” due in large part to lack of “detailed 
descriptions of initiatives” and insufficient outcome data (Dick, et al., 2006).  The review cites 
one randomized control study in Nigeria that finds improvements in knowledge and treatment-
seeking behavior for sexually transmitted diseases (STD) among high-school students from a 
school-level treatment involving “community participation, peer education, public lectures, 
health clubs in the schools, and training of STD treatment providers” (Okonofua et al., 2003).  
By estimating the impact of NAFCI on teen pregnancy, this paper is the first to my knowledge to 
examine the impact of youth friendly services on fertility outcomes.   
                                                 
12 The clinical accreditation process is described in detail in Ashton et al. (2009),  and Dickson-Tetteh et al. (2001).  
The ten NAFCI standards are listed in Appendix Table 3.1.  The education component of NAFCI is also discussed in 
Ashton et al. (2009). 
13 http://www.lovelife.org.za/corporate/lovelife-programmes/youth-leadership-development/groundbreakers/ 
14 In the US there have been randomized control trials of impact of sex education programs that find comprehensive 
sex-education reduces teen pregnancy compared to no sex-education, but that abstinence-only education has 




3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy to Measure the Impact of NAFCI on Early Teen 
Pregnancy 
 This paper’s research design is facilitated by geo-linking data on the timing and location 
of the NAFCI rollout to birth histories in nationally representative survey data.  My empirical 
specification uses proximity to a NAFCI clinic during adolescence as a plausibly exogenous 
measure of access to reproductive health services and education and estimates the impact on 
early teen fertility.  Linked census and health provision data provide controls and evidence on the 
impact of the initiative.  Data on satellite locations that only offered the education component of 
the program but were not linked to a clinic help to separate out the impacts of the clinical versus 
the education components and suggest that interventions linked to clinics are most effective.   
3.3.A Data to Geo-link NAFCI Rollout to Adolescent Birth Histories 
 I geo-link several datasets to implement my research design: 1) loveLife Project 
Monitoring Database, 2) District Health Information System (DHIS) GPS and Service Provision 
by Facility files, 3) National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) Secure Data and Secure 
Administrative Data, and 4) the 2001 South African Census. 
 The loveLife Project Monitoring Database provides names of each NAFCI clinic and 
month and year the accreditation process began. Based on interviews with loveLife and clinic 
staff, I estimate that the effective start date of “youth friendly” services is one year after 
accreditation began.15 District Health Information System (DHIS) facility-level files provide 
GPS coordinates and monthly service provision data for every public health facility in South 
Africa from 2001 to 2012.16  Figure 3.4 shows the location and start year of NAFCI clinics from 
                                                 
15 The database also provides start dates and locations for loveLife “outlets” which provide the education component 
of the program, but are not linked to a health facility.   
16 The District Health Information System (DHIS) is a health management information system and data warehouse 
developed by the Health Information Systems Programme (HISP) used by the South African Department of Health 
(DOH) to collect and monitor routine health data.  This data is the basis of the annual South African District Health 
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2000 to 2010 based on linking the loveLife database with the DHIS.  I also use contraceptive 
distribution (including the two major injectables, pills, iuds, condoms) and reported sexually 
transmitted diseases (STIs) aggregated to an annual level to track changes in service provision by 
facility type—NAFCI or non-NAFCI.   
 The National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) is a nationally representative longitudinal 
household survey of over 28,000 individuals in 7,300 households fielded every two years starting 
in 2008 (SALDRU, 2014).  NIDS includes detailed birth histories for all women over the age of 
14 at the time of interview. NIDS secure data includes GPS coordinates of residence at time of 
interview as well as residency history including city/suburb of birth, residence in 1994, 2006, 
2009 and 2011.17  Secure administrative data also include GPS of last school attended, which is 
important as youth often go to clinics near school rather than home both for convenience and 
confidentiality.    
 The key variables in my analysis are age at first birth and distance of residence (or 
school) to a NAFCI clinic during adolescence.  I define a sample of approximately 2000 female 
NIDS respondents age 19 to 26 in 2010 (wave 2).18   I create a birth history variable with three 
categories: first birth by 18, first birth after 18 or no births.  I use retrospective residence 
questions to determine where each woman lived each year when she was aged 12 to 17.  If she 
still resides in that location, I have the GPS of residence during adolescence; otherwise I use the 
GPS of the centroid of the “main-place” of residence to approximate her location in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Barometer that provides indicators of the health system at district level.  Monthly facility-level data was obtained 
with authorization from the DOH and with assistance from HISP.   
17  Secure NIDS data can only be accessed at the DataFirst secure facility at the University of Cape Town upon 
approval by the NIDS management committee. 
18 This age range was chosen with an eye to examining second-stage employment outcomes—women who are old 
enough to plausibly be out of secondary school and in the labor force.  
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adolescence.19  I calculate the distance in kilometers from residence (school) to the nearest 
NAFCI clinic for each year a woman was 12 to 17.20  I create a binary variable for whether she 
lived (went to school) within five kilometers of a NAFCI clinic.21 I also create a variable for 
distance to any public health facility at age 15. 
 Finally, I link each respondent to her reported sub- (or main-) place of residence at age 
fifteen.  There are 3,109 main-places and 21,243 sub-places designated in the 2001 South 
African census.22  I construct a set of variables describing demographic characteristics for each 
sub- and main-place in the 2001 South African census including rural/urban status, and percent 
of the population 20 and over with less than 12 years of schooling as a proxy for socio-economic 
status.  These serve as pre-policy control variables—NAFCI was piloted as early as 1999, but the 
main rollout occurred in the mid-2000s. 
3.3.B Empirical Strategy to use NAFCI Rollout as Plausibly Exogenous Increase Access to 
Reproductive Health Services 
 My empirical strategy exploits NAFCI’s staged rollout across South Africa to identify the 
impact of changes in adolescent access to contraception and sex education on early teen 
pregnancy.  The key identification assumption is that the timing and location of clinic 
accreditation is uncorrelated with other determinants of fertility timing.  For example, I need to 
assume that clinic locations were not chosen where teen fertility, either in terms of levels or 
trends, was different than otherwise similar locations.  Similarly, if accreditation was pursued 
where demand for contraception was highest, this would also threaten identification.  I provide 
                                                 
19 Retrospective location questions were asked at a suburb/town level, but the raw responses are currently coded 
only to the Main Place level. 
20 Distances are calculated using the user-written command geonear (Picard, 2010).  “geonear finds the nearest 
neighbors using geodetic distances, i.e. the length of the shortest curve between two points along the surface 
of a mathematical model of the earth.” 
21 I chose 5 km based on conversations with clinic staff and loveLife provincial managers. 




both empirical and institutional evidence to suggest that geographic distribution of NAFCI 
clinics is effectively random after controlling for observable characteristics.   
 First, to provide evidence that NAFCI had a impact on service provision at clinics, I use 
facility-level DHIS data to measure changes in reproductive health services provided at NAFCI 
relative to non-NAFCI clinics before and after accreditation using an event-study framework 
(Jacobson et al., 1993).  A descriptive background provides a context for the event study 
analysis.  Appendix Figure 3.2 shows the overall trends in service provision of male condoms, 
the two major injectables, Depo-Provera and NET-N, and reports of new sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs) from 2001 to 2011.  The figure shows a strong upward trend in condom 
distribution and fall in new STI cases over the period.  Injectable provision was relatively flat 
with evidence of some switching between the two types.    
 Figure 3.6 shows relative changes in service provision at NAFCI clinics after 
accreditation, accounting for the national trends shown in Appendix Figure 3.2 using non-
NAFCI clinics as controls and calendar year-fixed effects.  After accreditation there is a trend 
break in the number of condoms distributed (increase) and STIs reported (decrease) at NAFCI 
clinics compared to non-NAFCI clinics.  The relatively flat pre-accreditation trend lends 
credibility to the assumption that the initiative did not target clinics that had different growth 
trajectories from the average clinic.  Figure 3.6 provides evidence that NAFCI clinics increased 
condom distribution at a faster rate than non-NAFCI clinics and that the new STI rate fell more 
quickly at NAFCI clinics. 
 There is also evidence in the lower two panels of Figure 3.6 for trend breaks in the two 
main injectable contraceptives, though the provision of NET-EN increases while the provision of 
 102 
 
Depo-Provera decreases.  This may be explained by NAFCI-trained clinic staff attempting to 
dispel the perception that Depo-Provera is “not for youth.”  Depo-Provera is much more likely 
than NET-EN to cause temporary amenorrhea (absence of a menstrual period)(Draper et al., 
2006), which leads some to believe it causes infertility or other health problems (Wood and 
Jewkes, 2006) 
 Next I regress whether a respondent lived near a NAFCI clinic during adolescence on 
2001 characteristics (urban/rural and percent with less than secondary degree) of the main-place 
where the respondent lived at age 15 and on 53 district council fixed effects.  Many of the 
coefficients (Appendix Table 3.1) are statistically significant which is not surprising as the 
initiative was generally focused on areas of high need and low socio-economic status.  However, 
only around 10 percent of all clinics were accredited as youth friendly by 2009 and I control for 
all of these variables when estimating the impact of NAFCI.  As long as accreditation was 
random conditional on these controls, the identification assumption will still hold.  Granted, this 
remains a strong assumption given the evidence provided so far.  I continue to collect empirical 
evidence through more extensive controls and in the meantime I argue the case of conditionally 
random placement based on institutional knowledge gathered though interviews with 
stakeholders involved with the rollout process.   
 Based on interviews with people involved with the rollout of NAFCI, my understanding 
is that clinics were chosen in a relatively ad hoc way that varied by province and district. 23   
According to the first director of loveLife, statistics on teen pregnancy and HIV were not used as 
selection criteria as those statistics did not exist with any geographic detail at the time.   I was 
                                                 
23 I conducted extensive interviews with eight current and past employees and consultants of loveLife. I interviewed 
two provincial managers who were at loveLife during the initial implementation of the program.  I visited NAFCI-




told on multiple occasions that since clinics were usually chosen by provincial or district level 
departments of health, and that varying personalities and agendas of provincial or district 
managers led to a “random” mix of clinics across the country (though they did not mean a formal 
random selection process was used).  In some cases “struggling” clinics were targeted, and in 
others clinics that were perceived to be doing relatively well were rewarded by being chosen for 
the program.  There were many more clinics that either wanted to be involved, or that district 
managers wanted to be include, than could be accommodated due to the intensity and expense of 
the program.  NAFCI was targeted at high-need communities; however, there are an abundance 
of high-need communities across South Africa.  I feel confident that many clinics that were 
otherwise similar to chosen clinics were not selected simply due to lack of funds, organization 
and time.    
3.3.C Empirical Specifications 
 Equation (1) highlights my strategy of measuring the impact of adolescent–friendly clinic 
access in adolescence (𝑡 − 1) on fertility outcomes measured in adulthood (t). 
(1)          𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡   = 𝛼0 + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖            
 
Specifically, I estimate a linear probability model by ordinary least squares where the outcome is 
a binary indicator of having a first birth by age 18.  I define NAFCI access with a binary 
indicator for living (or going to school) within 5 kilometers of a NAFCI clinic any time between 
age 12 and 17 as in Equation (2)  
(2)          1[𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑦 18]𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 1[𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐶𝐼 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐 < 5𝑘𝑚]𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖 
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where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1  are demographic characteristics of place of residence at age 15 from the 2001 
census, and 𝛿𝑗 are district fixed effects.
24 
 I also estimate multinomial logit models where the outcome is fertility timing categorized 
as 1) no births, 2) first birth by 18 or 3) first birth after 18.  This specification allows me to 
separate out impacts on the timing versus extensive margin. 
3.4 Estimates of the Impact of NAFCI on Teen Fertility 
 Table 3.1 compares birth histories for the NIDS sample with and without access to 
NAFCI-accredited clinics. Of the roughly 2000 women in the sample, 250 lived near a NAFCI 
clinic in adolescence; and despite the fact that NAFCI clinics were placed in poor communities 
the prevalence of early teen births is lower among those who lived near a clinic. This result is 
shown to be marginally significant in the first column of Table 3.2, which gives estimates of 
equation (2) without controls or fixed effects.  As seen in the second column, the estimated effect 
of living near a clinic is stronger when I control for geographic characteristics.  This makes sense 
if clinics that became accredited were on average in poorer, higher teen-pregnancy locations.  
The estimated 7.7 percentage point drop in the likelihood of having a first birth by age 18 is 
significant at a 5 percent level.  The third column of Table 3.2 shows that attending a school 
within 5 km of a NAFCI clinic also reduced the likelihood of a birth by 18 by a statistically 
significant 10.8 percentage points.  Given the mean rates of teen childbearing in non-NAFCI 
areas shown in Table 3.1, a 7.7 percentage points represents a 44 percent drop in the rate of early 
teen pregnancy. 
 The multinomial logit coefficients shown in Table 3.3 show a statistically significant 
reduction in the odds of having a first births by age 18 compared to no births, but a small and 
                                                 
24 There are 53 districts in South Africa.  I choose district level fixed effects as districts can be thought of as local 
labor markets as described in (Dinkelman, 2011). 
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insignificant reduction on the odds of having a birth after 18 compared to no births.25  These 
results imply that NAFCI’s effect was to delay rather than reduce fertility.   
 Table 3.4 compares the results of living near a NAFCI clinic to living near other types of 
loveLife facilities that only provided an education intervention but were not linked to a clinic—
Outlets, Franchises and Y-Centers.  These results may allow me to parse out the separate impact 
of education and clinical access and suggest that the education component alone had a smaller 
and less significant impact.  Living near an education-only facility, does not have a significant 
impact on likelihood of having a birth by age 18.  These results suggest that the education 
intervention alone is not as effective, but cannot resolve if linking the two components is more 
important or if the clinical component alone is driving the results in Table 3.1. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 My results for the impact of NAFCI in South Africa indicate that a youth-targeted 
reproductive health initiative has the potential to substantially and significantly reduce the 
likelihood of early teen pregnancy.  More research is required to disentangle the education and 
clinical access components of the NAFCI intervention, but it is clear that increasing teen access 
to clinics is key to the success of the program.  While not ruling out the importance of the 
demand side, my results imply that reducing barriers to contraceptive supply has a causal impact 
on fertility timing among adolescents in the South African context. 
 The policy concern surrounding teen childbearing stems largely from a belief that early 
age at first birth leads to negative consequences for later life outcomes.  The findings of the 
current paper and its data and empirical strategy lay the groundwork to study these longer-term 
                                                 
25 A negative coefficient implies that living near a clinic reduces the odds of the given outcome relative to the 




outcomes.  Since the 1990s, there has been mounting evidence from the US that adverse socio-
economic outcomes for teen mothers are not the causal impact of early fertility, but rather echoes 
of the correlation between circumstances in adolescence and later life outcomes.26  However, 
there is little evidence to disentangle the causes and consequences of teen childbearing in low 
and middle-income countries.  Recent work by Lang and Weinstein (2013) point out that the 
consensus debunking the negative consequences of teen motherhood is based on the analysis of 
teen births that occurred after Roe v. Wade when contraceptive access was widespread in the US.  
Analyzing an earlier period when family planning was not easily accessible for minors, they 
estimate negative causal impacts of teen motherhood.27  Limited or uneven access to 
contraception characterizes many developing countries today.  Herrera and Sahn (2013) studying 
Madagascar and Ranchhod, et al. (2011) studying an urban area in South Africa conclude that a 
negative impact of early childbearing remains after controlling for family background and 
economics circumstances in adolescence.  These findings suggest an important role in 
developing economies for policies like NAFCI that improve young people’s ability to plan 
fertility. 
  
                                                 
26 In 1992 Geronimus and Korenman showed that, controlling for family background by comparing sister pairs with 
one teen and one non-teen mother, much of the cross-sectional difference in outcomes for teen  versus non-teen 
mothers disappears and in terms of child outcomes even reverses. 
27 They hypothesize that once contraception and abortion are widely available, anyone for whom the cost would of 
early childbearing is high will avoid or terminate the pregnancy. 
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Figure 3.3. Rollout of National Adolescent Friendly Clinic Initiative                                     









Figure 3.4. Geography and Timing of National Adolescent Friendly Clinic Initiative Rollout 
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 Source: loveLife project monitoring database and District Health Information System (DHIS) 
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Figure 3.6. Changes in Reproductive Health Service Provision Relative to Year 
of NAFCI Accreditation 
 
Notes: Source: Service provision data from the South African District Health Information System.  
Information on timing of clinic accreditation form loveLife Project Monitoring Databases.  Each plot 
shows the change in amount of a given service/contraceptive provided at the clinic relative to the level in 
year zero (one year after the accreditation process started).  These estimates control for national trends in 
service provision by including controls for trends among non-NAFCI accredited clinics and calendar year 
fixed effects.  Results, not shown, including province fixed-effects and year×province fixed-effects show 
very similar patterns.  Depo-provera (depot medroxyprogesterone acetate) and NET-EN (norethisterone 
oenanthate) are long-acting injectable contraceptives.  Depo-provera is given every three months and 
NET-EN every two months.  In the figures above the number of injections are annualized by dividing the 
number to Depo injections by six and the number of NET-EN injections by four.  The 2004 mean levels 
listed in each section of the graph are calculated among all public clinics.  See Appendix Figure 3.2 for 
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207 doses per year 
2004 mean: 
304 doses per year 
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Table 3.1. Women age 19 to 26, by birth category and NAFCI access 
no yes no yes
No Births 717 124 41.41 52.18
Birth by 18 302 46 13.77 9.85
Birth after 18 753 80 44.82 37.97
  Total 1772 250
 
Percentage in each birth category                             
(using NIDS sampling weights)Sample Size
Ever lived within 5km of  a YFS clinic when age 12-17?
Notes: Source: Respondents from the South African National Income Dynamics Study 
Wave 2 geo-linked to NAFCI clinics using data from District Health Information 




Table 3.2. Estimated Impact of Access to NAFCI Clinics on Likelihood of Birth by Age 18 
Dependent variable: birth by age 18 School Near NAFCI Clinic
Had Access to Youth Friendly Clinics -0.039* -0.077** -0.108**
      any time when aged 12-17 (0.023) (0.035) (0.045)
Population group (African omitted)
Coloured 0.047 0.174*
(0.047) (0.090)






Kilometers to any public clinic -0.002
(0.002)
Main Place controls yes yes
District Council fixed effects yes yes
Constant 0.138*** -1.201 -2.057
(0.011) (1.044) (1.589)
Observations 2,025 2,009 931
R-squared 0.002 0.063 0.099
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Lived Near NAFCI Clinic
Type of Access
Notes: Source: NIDS wave 2.  Sample includes all women age 19 to 26 including women who have not given birth.  
Being "near" means that the clinic was within 5km of residence or school respectively.  Main place is a South Africa 
Census geographic designation one level below a Municipality.  Main Place controls are i) percent of the population 
20 and older with less than 12 years of schooling, and ii) rural/urban status.  Main place controls are based on the 
2001 census and are linked to the respondent's location in 2001 -- prior to roll out of NAFCI.  Sample size smaller 








Table 3.3. Multinomial Logit Estimates of Impact of NAFCI on Fertility Timing 
Birth by 18 Birth after 18
Lived within 5km of NAFCI clinic -0.8389** -0.1145





Population group (African omitted)
Coloured 0.0165 -0.1940
(0.4863) (0.4253)
White and other -2.7717 -1.1523
(0.9530) (0.6160)
Main Place controls
District Council fixed effects
Constant
                                      Odds of Birth Before or After 18 Relative to No Birth





Notes: Source: NIDS wave 2.  Sample includes all women age 19 to 26 including women who 
have not given birth.  Main place is a South Africa Census geographic designation one level
below a Municipality.  Main Place controls are i) percent of the population 20 and older with 
less than 12 years of schooling, and ii) rural/urban status.  Main place controls are based on the 





Table 3.4. Comparing Impact of Access to NAFCI Clinics to Impact of Other loveLife 
facilities on Likelihood of Birth by Age 18 









Lived near facility any time when 









Population group (African omitted)
Coloured 0.047 0.089 0.057 0.054
(0.047) (0.076) (0.048) (0.047)
White and other -0.063* -0.013 -0.061* -0.062*
(0.034) (0.041) (0.033) (0.034)
Age 0.118 -0.013 0.106 0.115
(0.092) (0.324) (0.092) (0.092)
Age^2 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
km_to_PC -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Main Place controls yes yes yes yes
District Council fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Constant -1.201 0.160 -1.089 -1.189
(1.044) (3.324) (1.060) (1.055)
Observations 2,009 1,303 2,009 2,009
R-squared 0.063 0.067 0.059 0.059




Notes: Source: NIDS wave 2.  Sample includes all women age 19 to 26 including 
women who have not given birth.  Being "near" means that the facility was within 5km 
of residence.  Main place is a South Africa Census geographic designation one level 
below a Municipality.  Main Place controls are i) percent of the population 20 and older 
with less than 12 years of schooling, and ii) rural/urban status.  Main place controls are 
based on the 2001 census and are linked to the respondent's location in 2001--prior to 





Appendix Figure 3.1. South African Census 2001 geographical area hierarchy structure 
 




21,243 Sub Places 
3,109 Main Places 
9 Provinces 
53 District Councils 
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Appendix Figure 3.2. Trends in Reproductive Health Service Provision  
among All Public Clincs by Year 
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Appendix Table 3.1. National Adolescent Friendly Clinic Initiative Standards 
 
1.  Management systems are in place to support the effective provision of adolescent-
friendly services.
2.  The clinic has policies and processes that support the rights of adolescents. 
3. Clinic services appropriate to the needs of adolescents are available and accessible.  
4.  The clinic has a physical environment conducive to the provision of adolescent 
friendly health services
5.  The clinic has the drugs, supplies and equipment necessary to provide the essential 
service package for adolescent-friendly health care.
6.  Information, education and counseling consistent with the Essential Service Package 
are provided
7.  Systems are in place to train staff to provide effective adolescent-friendly services.
8.  Adolescents receive an accurate psychosocial and physical assessment.
9.  Adolescents receive individualized care on based on standard service delivery 
guidelines.
10.  The clinic provides continuity of care for adolescents.  
 
  Source: (Ashton, et al., 2009) 
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coefficient Std. Err. t P>|t|
2001 Main Place Controls 
(Rural omitted)
   Urban 0.2153 (0.0282) 7.64 0.000
   Semi/urban 0.1226 (0.0252) 4.86 0.000
   Percentage less then 12 yrs 0.0049 (0.0007) 7.04 0.000
District Council fixed effects 
2 0.2380 (0.1165) 2.04 0.041
3 -0.1955 (0.1794) -1.09 0.276
4 0.2337 (0.1396) 1.67 0.094
5 -0.2074 (0.2635) -0.79 0.431
6 -0.1822 (0.1905) -0.96 0.339
7 -0.1171 (0.2760) -0.42 0.671
8 -0.1023 (0.1678) -0.61 0.542
9 0.5446 (0.1321) 4.12 0.000
10 0.0994 (0.1343) 0.74 0.46
12 0.0313 (0.1150) 0.27 0.786
13 -0.0655 (0.1185) -0.55 0.581
14 0.1814 (0.1308) 1.39 0.165
15 -0.1248 (0.1049) -1.19 0.234
16 -0.1817 (0.1716) -1.06 0.29
17 -0.0870 (0.1125) -0.77 0.439
18 -0.1724 (0.1153) -1.49 0.135
19 -0.1354 (0.1169) -1.16 0.247
20 -0.1246 (0.1260) -0.99 0.323
21 -0.0980 (0.1144) -0.86 0.392
22 0.0423 (0.1109) 0.38 0.703
23 -0.1066 (0.1160) -0.92 0.358
24 -0.1081 (0.1269) -0.85 0.394
25 0.2526 (0.1276) 1.98 0.048
26 -0.0928 (0.1162) -0.8 0.425
27 -0.0998 (0.1207) -0.83 0.408
28 -0.1039 (0.1187) -0.88 0.381
29 -0.0699 (0.1252) -0.56 0.577
30 0.0982 (0.1175) 0.84 0.403
31 -0.0010 (0.1077) -0.01 0.993
32 0.0523 (0.1092) 0.48 0.632
33 -0.0862 (0.1092) -0.79 0.43
34 0.0734 (0.1161) 0.63 0.527
35 -0.0433 (0.1063) -0.41 0.684
36 0.0010 (0.1198) 0.01 0.993
37 0.0382 (0.1120) 0.34 0.733
38 -0.0646 (0.1138) -0.57 0.571
39 0.0262 (0.1218) 0.22 0.830
40 -0.1023 (0.1455) -0.7 0.482
42 0.1941 (0.1063) 1.83 0.068
43 -0.1426 (0.1331) -1.07 0.284
44 -0.1209 (0.1306) -0.93 0.355
76 0.1374 (0.1059) 1.3 0.195
81 0.1783 (0.1843) 0.97 0.333
82 0.1815 (0.1588) 1.14 0.253
83 -0.0508 (0.1072) -0.47 0.635
84 0.1010 (0.1138) 0.89 0.375
88 0.3582 (0.1227) 2.92 0.004
171 0.5153 (0.1033) 4.99 0.000
275 0.2626 (0.1086) 2.42 0.016
572 -0.0515 (0.1014) -0.51 0.611
773 0.3873 (0.1045) 3.71 0.000
774 0.1038 (0.1031) 1.01 0.314
constant -0.3255146 0.115812 -2.81 0.005
Observations 2030
R-squared 0.3156
Appendix Table 3.1. Correlates of NAFCI Clinic Placement
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